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ABSTRACT
Most `causal' approaches to reasoning about action have not addressed the basic question of causality directly:
what has to be the case in a domain in order for the assertion `A causes B' to be valid with respect to the
domain? Pearl's recent causal theories based on structural equations do provide an answer to this question.
In this paper, we extend Pearl's formalism so that the typical problems encountered in common sense reasoning
about action can be represented in it. The resulting theory comes in both a propositional and a rst-order
version. The propositional version turns out to be capable of handling many complicated instances of the ram-
ication problem, including domains that contain cyclic causal relationships. It also provides new insights into
actions with non-deterministic and/or `disjunctive' eects. The rst-order version additionally handles domains
with `dependent' uents, incompletely specied action schedules, causal chains of events and `surprises'. We
provide an in-depth comparison between our theory and three other recent approaches: those of McCain &
Turner, Baral & Gelfond and Lin. For the former two, we show that they can be reinterpreted as approximations
of our extension of Pearl's theory: we prove theorems stating that for large classes of reasoning domains, they
permit the same inferences as our theory does, and we give examples of reasoning domains that fall outside
these classes, for which our approach clearly works better. For the approach of Lin, we show informally that,
for those reasoning domains on which both his and our approach are dened, the two approaches are nearly
equivalent. In this way we are able to establish a connection between Lin's approach and Pearl's semantics of
causation. Since all concepts in our theory which involve causality are dened in completely non-causal terms,
we hope that our work may help bridge the conceptual gap between `causal' and `non-causal' approaches to
common sense temporal reasoning.
1991 Computing Reviews Classication System: I.2.3,I.2.4
Keywords and Phrases: common sense reasoning, temporal reasoning, causality, nonmonotonic reasoning.
Note: work carried out within the theme INS, under SION-project 612-16-507 `MDL-Neurocomputing'.
1. Introduction
Recently there has been a strong revival of causality-based approaches to common-sense reasoning
about action [23, 25, 24, 21, 22, 38, 5]. Causal approaches have proven to be particularly useful in
the context of modeling ramications and actions with non-deterministic eects. Indeed, it has been
argued by some [38] that the explicit modeling of causal relationships is a necessary ingredient of any
solution to the ramication problem. Still, witness the frequently heated debates on the issue taking
place during workshops and conferences, it seems that many researchers remain skeptical about the
power and applicability of causal approaches. A reason for this may be that hardly any of these
approaches has addressed the basic issue of causality directly: what has to be the case in the world
in order for the assertion `A causes B' to be valid? In other words, it is not attempted to dene
causal relationships in non-causal terms. In stead, causal domain knowledge is formalized explicitly,
typically as rules of the form `A causes B' { and the approaches rely on the assumption that their
semantics will yield the right inferences from such assertions.
On the other hand, J. Pearl has provided an empirical semantics for causation that has met with
considerable success in statistical applications [29, 30, 31, 32]. However, as will be explained below,
Pearl's theory as such cannot be directly applied to common-sense reasoning about action and change.
2In this paper, we extend Pearl's theory in a straightforward way so as to overcome this hindrance.
In this way we arrive at a causal theory that has the advantage that it can also be understood in
non-causal terms, namely as a theory that gives a certain semantics to `actions'. The theory turns out
to provide a simple solution for many of the notorious problems of common-sense temporal reasoning .
Moreover, we nd that the resulting theory is remarkably similar to several existing causal approaches,
most notably Thielscher's [38] and Lin's [21, 22]. For the causal approaches of McCain and Turner
[23, 25] and Baral and Gelfond [3, 5], we show that they can be reinterpreted as approximations of our
extension of Pearl's theory: we provide theorems stating that for large classes of reasoning domains,
they permit the same inferences as our theory does, and we give examples of reasoning domains that
fall outside these classes, for which, we claim, our approach works better.
Structure of this report In section 2 we provide an informal introduction to Pearl's semantics of
causation. We then introduce a simple, propositional extension of Pearl's theory. In section 4 we
instantiate our theories to domains involving persistence. This allows us to handle the ramication
problem, as we show in section 5. Section 6 discusses how our propositional causal theories deal with
nondeterminism. In section 7 we extend our theory to the rst-order case and show how this allows us
to handle `dependent' uents [11], concurrent events, causal chains of events and surprises. Section 8
then compares our theory to the approaches of McCain & Turner, Lin and Baral & Gelfond. We end
with some conclusions. We provide an extensive appendix, which spells out in detail how our causal
theory arises as a straightforward extension of Pearl's. Our other appendices contain proofs of the
theorems presented throughout the paper.
2. An Informal Introduction to Causal Theories
2.1 Actions Remove Some Dependencies, but keep others Intact!
Causal theories are about domains of variables whose values may be inuenced by interventions. Each
variable X in the domain depends in some deterministic manner on a subset S(X) of all the other
variables; here `deterministic' means that the value of X is completely determined by the values of
the variables in S(X). Now if an intervention takes place that sets the value of a variable X to some
value, then some of the variables in S(X) become independent of X while the rest of the variables
in S(X) keep their dependence. If we equate an action with a set of interventions, this induces a
semantics for the concept of `action'. This resulting semantics, which will be discussed in more detail
below, has sometimes been called the sucient cause principle [8, 7]. An action that sets the value
of a variable X is then called a `sucient cause' for X .
We give a simple example: let us denote by Alive(t) whether or not some turkey is alive at time t.
Normally, i.e. if no interventions take place, we have that if it is given that the turkey is alive at time
t+1, we can deduce that it will also be alive at time t+2 and that it already had been alive at time
t. Now if an intervention takes place that sets Alive(t+1) to false (for example, if somebody shoots
at the turkey), then the value of Alive at time t+1 becomes independent of the value of Alive at time
t: we can no longer infer anything on whether or not the turkey was alive at time t (disappearance
of a dependency). On the other hand, the dependency between Alive(t+ 1) and Alive(t+ 2) has not
disappeared: we can still infer that the turkey will not be alive at time t+ 2.
Hence if we have a causal theory for a domain, and we know the interventions that take place in
the domain, we end up with a new, updated causal theory. We now discuss two equivalent ways of
dening how such a new theory may be arrived at.
Causal Graphs and Structural Equations We can depict the dependencies between the dierent vari-
ables of a given causal theory as a (possibly cyclic) causal graph [8, 7]. Figure 1 shows the causal graph
for the example above. The semantics of actions can now be characterized in terms of these causal
graphs: if an action takes place that sets the variable X to some value, then that variable becomes
independent of all its non-descendants in the graph. Hence the intervention changes the theory into
a new, updated one that is characterized by the causal graph in which all incoming arcs into the
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Figure 1: A Very Simple Causal Graph.
node corresponding to X have been removed while all other arcs remain. The graph does not give
any information about the exact functional relationships between the variables in the domain, but
only about which variables become independent in the presence of an intervention; we can now either
regard causal theories as causal graphs together with a description of the functional relations between
parents and children in the graph, or, as has been done by Pearl in his more recent papers [31, 32] we
can avoid using graphs by writing the functional relations in the form of structural equations : these
are equations with a directionality attached to them. A set of structural equations for our example
would look as follows: fAlive(1) = Alive(0) ; Alive(2) = Alive(1) ; : : : g. Our action semantics, i.e.
the sucient cause principle, can now be rephrased like this: if an intervention takes place that sets
variable X to value x, then the structural equation X = : : : is replaced by the new equation X = x. In
our example, if just one intervention takes place, and this intervention sets Alive(2) to false, then the
equation Alive(2) = Alive(1) gets replaced by Alive(2) = false, while all other structural equations
remain unchanged.
In Pearl's terminology, each structural equation can be seen as a micro theory [8]. It describes a
single `mechanism' whose input and output are given by, respectively, the right-hand and the left-hand
side of the equation. All these mechanisms are coupled to form a complete theory. But if an interven-
tion takes place, some of the mechanisms get decoupled form the rest and the output they normally
provide is replaced by the result of the intervention. In other words, in Pearl's theory interventions are
dened as surgeries on the set of mechanisms: an intervention keeps some of the mechanisms intact,
while `turning o' others, thereby changing the behaviour of the system of mechanisms as a whole.
Why we need to extend Pearl's theories In common-sense reasoning about action, we are typically
interested in domains where the fact whether or not an intervention takes place may depend on the
values of some of the variables in the domain; this is impossible to model in Pearl's [31, 32] basic theory.
Pearl's theory also lacks the representational power needed to express global domain constraints. For
example, we may have Alive(t)  :Dead(t) irrespective of any action that inuences the value of
Alive; this formula should always hold in our domains and should not be replaced when Alive is set
to false. It is therefore not a structural equation. All constraints between variables in Pearl's basic
theory must be given in the form of structural equations, so it is impossible to model such a global
constraint. In our work we extend Pearlian causal theories in a way that allows us to represent both
kinds of domain knowledge mentioned here. We do this by simply adding to the set of structural
equations a set of global constraints, consisting of formulas that should hold in all models of our
theories irrespective of what interventions take place. These global constraints then are also allowed
to mention interventions. To be able to express those, we introduce for each propositional variable
X in our domain two additional propositional variables Do(X;true) and Do(X; false), representing
interventions setting X either to true or to false.
3. Propositional Causal Theories
Our propositional causal theories are a straightforward extension of Pearl's causal theories. In ap-
pendix 1.1 we show exactly how they are related to Pearl's causal theories as dened in [31, 32].
Preliminaries Let B = ftrue; falseg. A truth value is an element of B. Let X be a set of
propositional variables, i.e. variables taking on truth values. We assume a standard propositional
language for X containing the additional symbols true and false which are abbreviations of X _:X
4and X ^ :X respectively; here X is any variable in X. A valuation or interpretation of X is an
assignment of truth values to the variables in X. A valuation M is a model for a set of propositional
formulas   (written asM j=  ) if   is true inM; here truth of propositional formulas with respect to
interpretations is dened as usual. Until section 7,`j=' will stand for standard propositional entailment,
later it may also stand for standard rst-order entailment. `' always denotes proper inclusion.
Causal Theories and their Models Here is our initial denition of causal theories:
Denition 3.1 A propositional causal theory T is a 4-tuple T = hV;U; eq;consi where
1. V = fX
1
; : : : ; X
n
g is a set of observed propositional variables
2. U = fU
1
; : : : ; U
m
g is a set of unobserved propositional variables
3. eq is a set of structural equations, i.e. propositional formulas of the form
X
i
 
i
(X
1
; : : : ; X
n
; U
1
; : : : ; U
m
) (1)
where 
i
is a formula involving zero or more of the variables X
1
; : : : ; X
n
; U
1
; : : : ; U
m
.
4. cons, the set of constraints, is a nite set of propositional formulas over variables V [U [ A(V).
Here A(V) is dened as the set of propositional variables
fDo(X
i
;true);Do(X
i
; false) j X
i
2 Vg
Notice that expressions of the form `Do(X
i
; b)' simply stand for propositional variables here. The set
U can be used to model external inuences we are ignorant about or that we consider unlikely; we
will only need it in section 6.
Example 1 Let T = hV;U; eq;consi be a causal theory withV = fAlive(0);Alive(1)g, U = ;, eq =
fAlive(1)  Alive(0)g, cons = fAlive(0);:Do(Alive(1); false);:Do(Alive(1);true)g. The equation
in eq expresses that the value of Alive persists (from time 0 to 1) if there are no interventions; the
formulas in cons ensure that Alive(0) should hold in all models of T and that there is no intervention
at time 1.
We now introduce the notion of models for causal theories. Condition (1) below simply ensures that
all constraints hold in all models; condition (2) implements the `sucient cause principle'.
Denition 3.2 A model for a propositional causal theory T = hV;U; eq;consi is a valuation M for
the variables in V [U [ A(V) such that
1. M j= cons
2. The restriction of M to the variables in V [ U is a model for the set of equations eq
0
, i.e.
M j= eq
0
. Here eq
0
is obtained from eq and M as follows:
For all X
i
2 V; b 2 B such that M j= Do(X
i
; b), we delete (if present) from eq the
equation X
i
 
i
(: : : ) and we add the equation X
i
 b.
Note that when we say thatM is a model for T , where T is a causal theory, we mean thatM satises
the two conditions of denition 3.2. However, when we say M is a model for   or when we write
M j=  , where   is a set of propositional formulas, then we mean that the formula   is true in M in
the standard sense of propositional logic.
Example 1, continued Let T be as in example 1 above. Condition (1) of denition 3.2 ensures that
all models M for T have M j= Alive(0) and that for all b, M j= :Do(Alive(1); b). By condition (2),
eq
0
= eq for all models and so we also have Alive(1) in all models for T : Alive persists. Now consider
a theory T
0
identical to T except that cons is now equal to cons = fAlive(0);Do(Alive(1); false)g.
By condition 1 of denition 3.2 we now haveM j= Alive(0)^Do(Alive(1); false) for all causal models
M. By condition 2 of that denition, we have eq
0
= fAlive(1)  falseg for all these models and thus
all models for T
0
must have :Alive(1).
54. Causal Theories Involving Persistence
In the remainder of this paper we consider domains in which two basic kinds of entities exist: uents,
which are properties of the world that, if no interventions take place, do not change over time, and
events, which will stand for the `triggers' of interventions. We use the term `event' rather than `action'
here since our `events' do not necessarily have to be performed by some agent { the dierence however
is not crucial in what follows. Causal theories for our domains of interest will thus be dened with
respect to a set of uents F and a set of events E; throughout this paper we assume these sets to
be nite. Specically, from now on we assume that for any causal theory for the sets E and F, the
set of observables V can be partitioned into two subsets: V
E
, the set of event { time pairs, and V
F
,
the set of uent { time pairs. In this section and the next, we are only interested in the behaviour of
our domains directly before and directly after some actions happen. We therefore restrict ourselves
to 2-state causal theories which represent domains using only two points in time: the initial point in
time t = 0 and the nal point in time t = 1. Given the set F = fF
1
; : : : ; F
n
g, V
F
can now be written
as V
F
= fF
1
(0); : : : ; F
n
(0); F
1
(1); : : : ; F
n
(1)g. Here F
i
(t) denotes uent i at time t. We assume that
all actions we are interested in happen at the same time, namely directly after the initial point in
time. Hence we do not have to index actions by time points and can simply let V
E
= E.
We dene a uent literal to be an expression of the form F or :F where F is some uent in F. The
initial state of a model M for a causal theory for sets E and F is the set fF j M j= F (0)g [ f:F j
M j= :F (0)g. The nal state of a model M is the set fF jM j= F (1)g [ f:F jM j= :F (1)g .
Example 2 We now extend our turkey domain with a new uent Dark. Dark(t) will denote that
it is dark at time t; shooting at the turkey will have its intended eect only if it is not dark (so
that one can aim properly). For this, let T be a causal theory such that V
E
= fShootg, V
F
=
fAlive(0);Dark(0);Alive(1);Dark(1)g; U = ;. eq contains two equations: fAlive(1)  Alive(0) ;
Dark(1)  Dark(0)g. cons contains the single axiom
[ :Dark(0) ^ Shoot ]  Do(Alive(1); false) (1)
There are potentially four dierent initial and nal states for T , corresponding to the four possible
interpretations of Alive and Dark. Let us look at the set of valuations M in which no Shoot-event
and no interventions take place; i.e. we have :Shoot and :Do(X; b) for any X 2 V; b 2 B. Clearly,
for any memberM ofM we haveM j= cons; hence condition (1) of denition 3.2 is satised. Since,
according to condition (2) of that denition, the updated set of equations eq
0
is equal to eq, the
valuations in M which also satisfy this condition are clearly exactly those in which the values of both
Alive and Dark persist. Thus M contains four models, each of which has the same initial and nal
state. Hence in models in which no interventions take place, we have persistence, which is in accord
with intuition.
4.1 We need more...
Let us now look at the set of all models M
0
for T in which the Shoot-event does take place. By
axiom (1) all M 2M
0
have M j= Do(Alive(1); false). The set eq
0
for these models must therefore
contain Alive(1)  false so each M 2 M
0
also has M j= :Alive(1). But notice that there is also
model M
0
2M
0
with
M
0
j= Dark(0) ^ :Dark(1) ^ Do(Dark(1); false);
since both conditions (1) and (2) of def. 3.2 are satised for M
0
.
This is not what we would intuitively expect! Intuitively, we would reason as follows: (1) there are
no interventions except those triggered by the Shoot-event ; (2) Shoot does not aect Dark, so the
value of Dark should remain unchanged after the Shoot-action.
What we have yet forgotten to model are the implicit assumptions behind (1) and (2), namely
that (a) there are no external interventions and that (b) actions aect no more things in the world
6than those we explicitly state they aect. Notice that, unlike assumption (a) and the assumption of
persistence, assumption (b) is not an assumption about the physics of our reasoning domains, i.e. it
is not an assumption about how the world works. Rather it is an assumption about what we really
mean when we specify our domain knowledge in a certain way. It is thus what Amsterdam calls a
`narrative convention' [1].
We could avoid having to live with assumption (b) by explicitly stating for each uent the complete
set of actions by which it can be aected. Indeed, something similar is done in several other approaches
[7, 8, 35]. However, one of the main problems we are interested in solving is the ramication problem
{ often, we will deal with actions that can have a very large number of indirect eects and it would
be very unwieldy to specify all of those explicitly; see section 5.
So let us look for another solution. When exactly does an `intervention', take place, or equivalently,
under what conditions is a variable set to a value? Variables are always set to a value in a specic
context : for example, Alive(1) is set to false only in a context in which Shoot and :Dark(0) is
true. Now suppose we are in one specic context; let us call it C. If there is a model M
1
with this
context and with M j= Do(X
i
; b) while there is also a model M
2
with the same context C and with
M j= :Do(X
i
; b), then we can be sure that nothing in our axioms states that in context C the uent
X
i
is set to value b. By assumptions (1) and (2) above, we should now prefer modelM
2
. Apparently,
we should partition our models into classes sharing the same context, and then within each such class
pick the model which has :Do(X
i
; b) for as many X
i
and b as possible.
Now what does it mean that two models `have the same context'? Clearly, the context should
contain at least every fact in the world that can possibly inuence whether or not an intervention
takes place. Since we assume (assumption 1) that there are no external events, we may safely say that
two models in which exactly the same events take place and the same uents hold at the same time
share the same context. Any two such models interpret all the variables in V and U the same; hence
we should partition our models into equivalence classes where each class corresponds to one particular
interpretation of the variables in V [U and contains all models with that particular interpretation.
For each equivalence class we should then pick the models which have a minimal interpretation (see
below) of Do. But notice that we must do all this before we replace the structural equation set eq by
eq
0
(step 2 of def. 3.2), since this replacement will only work if the Do-propositions already have the
right interpretations in each model.
We thus have to make precise the notion of `models that are minimal within a context'. First we
need some notation: let X be any set of propositional variables; let Y be some subset of X and let
M be any interpretation of the variables in X. We write Mc
Y
to denote the restriction of M to Y,
i.e. the set of assignments that M attaches to the variables in Y.
Now let again X be any set of propositional variables; let Y and Z be subsets of X with Y\Z = ;.
Let M and C be two interpretations of the variables in X and let   be a set of formulas over X.
Denition 4.1 We call M a minimal model for   of the variables Y within context Cc
Z
i:
1. M j=   and Mc
Z
= Cc
Z
.
2. there is no M
0
with M
0
j=  , M
0
c
Z
= Cc
Z
and
fY 2 Y j M
0
j= Y g  fY 2 Y j M j= Y g
where `' denotes proper inclusion.
We will thus be looking for the modelsM for cons with a minimal interpretation of A(V) in context
Mc
V[U
. It is important to realize that the minimization can never completely rule out any interpre-
tations of V and U: if M j= cons, then there must exist some minimal model M
0
for cons of A(V )
with the same context, i.e. with M
0
c
V[U
=Mc
V[U
We call causal theories in which Do still has to be minimized partially specied (since it is only
specied what uents are aected by events). In the remainder of this paper, we will assume that
7all our causal theories are actually partially specied ones. This brings us to the nal denition of
2-point causal theories and their models:
Denition 4.2 A 2-point causal theory for the set of uents F and the set of events E is a proposi-
tional causal theory T = hV;U; eq;consi such that
 V = V
F
[V
E
with V
F
= fF
i
(0); F
i
(1) j F
i
2 Fg and V
E
= E.
 eq = fF
i
(1)  F
i
(0) j F
i
2 Fg
Notice that the following denition only diers from denition 3.2 in its rst condition.
Denition 4.3 A model for a 2-point causal theory T = hV;U; eq;consi is a valuation M for the
variables in V [U [ A(V) such that
1. M is a minimal model for cons of the variables A(V) within context Mc
V[U
.
2. The restriction of M to the variables in V [U is a model for the set of equations eq
0
, where
eq
0
is obtained from eq and M as follows:
For all X
i
2 X; b 2 B such that M j= Do(X
i
; b), we delete (if present) from eq the
equation X
i
 
i
(: : : ) and we add the equation 
i
 b.
If M is a model for a 2-point causal theory T , we write Mj=
c
T .
We are now ready to harvest.
5. Ramifications
The ramication problem [34] has been given a lot of attention recently [21, 15, 23, 25, 38]. It occurs
in domains where an action or event has only a small number of direct eects while it can have a
very large number of indirect eects. For example, if a turkey is shot at, it will stop being alive, but
it will also stop walking, breathing, eating, pecking etc. Theories in which all such indirect eects of
an action are stated explicitly would quickly become unmanageably large. The ramication problem
can be dened as the problem of how to correctly represent the indirect eects of actions in a concise
manner. This cannot be simply done by adding constraints between uents to our theory; for example,
suppose the turkey from our previous examples may either be walking or not, denoted by the uent
Walking. As pointed out by several authors [23], if the turkey is alive and walking when being shot
at, it will stop walking: :Walking is a ramication of the eect of Shoot. But if the turkey is not alive
and somebody tries to make it walking (for example, by performing the action Entice), it will not
suddenly become alive! Alive is not a ramication of Entice; rather, :Alive is a qualication of Entice.
Clearly, a sentence of the form :Alive(t)  :Walking(t) is not enough to express this knowledge, since
it treats Alive(t) and :Walking(t) in an equivalent manner and therefore cannot represent the dierent
`dynamics' of Alive and :Walking.
Causal theories can handle domains like the above by making use of Do in domain constraints. Using
Do, we are able to express the dierence between an observation (e.g. :Alive(1)) and an intervention
(e.g. Do(Alive(1); false)). In the remainder of this section we will see that this is exactly what we
need to express complicated domain constraints; specically, we will often use axioms of the form
Do(F
1
; b)  Do(F
2
; b
0
); such an axiom can be interpreted as saying that any event in the domain that
sets the value of F
1
to b also sets the value of F
2
to b
0
.
In the remainder of this section we give a rst demonstration of the utility of 2-point causal theories
by showing how they correctly handle several types of ramication constraints that are known to pose
problems for many existing approaches; the only other approach we are aware of that handles all of
them correctly is Thielscher's [38]. In Thielscher's paper one also nds an excellent analysis of why
these examples cause so many diculties.
8Example 3 [The Walking Turkey] Let us formalize the example above. Consider the 2-point
causal theory T
wt
for the event and uent sets E = fShoot;Enticeg and F = fAlive;Walkingg. U = ;.
eq = fAlive(1)  Alive(0) ; Walking(1) Walking(0)g. cons consists of the following four axioms:
Shoot  Do(Alive(1); false) (1)
Entice  Do(Walking(1);true) (2)
:Alive(t)  :Walking(t) (3)
Do(Alive(t); false)  Do(Walking(t); false) (4)
Here axioms of the form (t) should be read as (0) ^ (1). We see that axiom (3) denotes a static
domain constraint (`there can be no state in which a turkey is both walking and not alive') while
axiom (4) denotes its corresponding `dynamics'.
Let us denote by M the set of models for T
wt
in which Shoot takes place while Entice does not;
by axioms (1) and (4) we have Do(Alive(1); false) and Do(Walking(1); false) in all such models. By
condition (1) of denition 4.3, we also have :Do(X
i
; b) for all other (X
i
; b). Hence, the updated set
of structural equations eq
0
for the models in M (denition 4.2) becomes:
Alive(1)  false ; Walking(1)  false
Hence all models in M have as their nal state f:Alive;:Walkingg. We also see (by checking
whether all the axioms in cons and eq
0
hold) that M contains models for three dierent initial
states: fAlive;Walkingg, fAlive;:Walkingg and f:Alive;:Walkingg. So the case in which the domain
constraints should entail a ramication of the Shoot-event works ne. Now for the models in which
no Shoot but an Entice event takes place. All such models have Do(Walking(1);true). By the
minimization of Do in condition (1) in denition 4.3 they also have :Do(Alive(1);true). Hence the
set eq
0
in condition (2) of that denition becomes
Alive(1)  Alive(0) ; Walking(1)  true
By axiom (3) all models M must then also have M j= Alive(1), and, since M j= eq
0
also M j=
Alive(0). This means that there are no models for T
wt
with both :Alive(0) and Entice: Entice has
Alive as an implicit qualication.
Example 4 [the Clever Turkey] The following example was introduced by Thielscher [38]. It is
interesting for two reasons: rst, as argued extensively by Thielscher [38], it cannot be handled by
McCain & Turner's theory of ramications [23]. Secondly, the example shows that it may be useful
to include axioms of the form
X  :Do(Y; b)
in cons to express qualications on interventions. Axioms corresponding to this form do not exist in
Thielscher's [38] formalism, and indeed, his formalization of the domain looks rather dierent from
ours.
Imagine we want to hunt a turkey using a trap-door rather than a gun. The turkey can be either
at the trap or not (denoted by uent At Trap) and the trap can be either open or closed (denoted by
Trap Open). If the turkey for some reason or another nds itself in an open trap, it dies. If we Entice
the turkey, it walks to the trap. However, the turkey is clever enough to never walk into an open trap.
We formalize this scenario in the 2-point causal theory T
ct
for setsE = fEnticeg;F = fAt Trap;Alive,
Trap Openg; U = ;; eq is as required by denition 4.2 and cons consists of:
Entice  Do(At Trap(1);true) (5)
[ At Trap(t) ^Do(Trap Open(t);true) ]  Do(Alive(t); false) (6)
[ At Trap(t) ^ Trap Open(t) ]  :Alive(t) (7)
Trap Open(0)  :Do(At Trap(1);true) (8)
9Consider the initial state
f:At Trap;Alive;Trap Openg
So the trap is open and the turkey is not at the trap. Suppose we want to entice the turkey; hence we
add the axiom Entice to cons; let the resulting theory be T
ct;2
. By axiom (5) the turkey will move
while by axiom (8) the turkey will not move: there are no models for T
ct;2
with the above initial state.
But now look at the initial state
f:At Trap;Alive;:Trap Openg (9)
and we want to entice the turkey and then open the trap. We thus add the following axiom to cons
and let the resulting theory be T
ct;3
:
Entice ^ Do(Trap Open(1);true) (10)
Notice that in initial state (9) there is nothing which contradicts T
ct;3
; by axiom (5) the set eq
0
in
denition 4.3 will contain: At Trap(1)  true. This means that in all models for T
ct;3
we have
At Trap(1); since we also have Do(Trap Open(1),true) in all these models, axiom (6) applies, and we
further have Do(Alive(1); false). Hence eq
0
further contains Alive(1)  false, and any model for
T
ct;3
will have nal state fAt Trap;:Alive;Trap Openg. It is easy to check that there indeed exists
an interpretation with such a nal state that is a model for T
ct;3
.
Example 5 [The Suitcase & Switches Problem] The following example is due to Lifschitz' [19].
It is equivalent to Lin's [21] `suitcase problem'. Imagine a light that is connected to two switches;
the light is only on if both of the switches are in the on-position: any event that puts a switch in the
on-position in a context in which the other switch is on, will have as a ramication that the light goes
on. However, if the event takes place in a context in which the other switch is not on, the light will not
be aected. The main importance of this example is that some previous approaches cannot express
the domain properly: they cannot rule out models in which, as a result of turning on one switch in
a context in which the other one is on already, the other switch may jump into the o-position while
light remains out; see Lin [21] for details. We formalize the domain using event and uent sets E = ;
and F = fSwi
1
;Swi
2
;Lightg. Swi
i
denotes that switch i is in the on-position. Let T
sw
be a causal
theory for E and F with U = ;, eq as usual and cons as follows:
[ Swi
1
(t) ^ Do(Swi
2
(t);true) ]  Do(Light(t);true) (11)
[ Swi
2
(t) ^ Do(Swi
1
(t);true) ]  Do(Light(t);true) (12)
Do(Swi
1
(t); false)  Do(Light(t); false) (13)
Do(Swi
2
(t); false)  Do(Light(t); false) (14)
(Swi
1
(t) ^ Swi
2
(t))  Light(t) (15)
Here axiom (15) describes a domain constraint that must hold in all models of the domain; the other
axioms describe the `dynamics' of the domain. Let us see whether we get the expected models for
T
sw
: suppose rst we turn on the rst switch while the second one is o; i.e. we add the axiom
:Swi
2
(0) ^ Do(Swi
1
(1);true) to cons. By the minimization of Do, we get :Do(Swi
2
(1); b) for all b
in all models. Hence eq
0
contains Swi
2
(1)  Swi
2
(0), so all models for T
sw
must have :Swi
2
(1). But
in all models with :Swi
2
(1), we already have (again by the minimization of Do) :Do(Light(1);true)
and :Light(1). It follows that all models will have :Light in their nal state; it is easy to see that
such models indeed exist. One can show in a similar manner that one obtains the intended models in
all other possible scenarios.
5.1 A First Glimpse at other approaches
We have seen in the introduction that, in Pearl's terminology, the proposition Do(X
i
; b) can be read
as `there is a sucient cause for X
i
to have the value b'. Indeed, usage of `Do' in axioms often
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corresponds to the colloquial use of the word `causes'. It turns out that if the word Do is replaced by
the word causes, then our axioms start to look very similar to those used in various other approaches.
We leave detailed comparisons until section 8 and give only a suggestive example for the time being.
In Thielscher's work, the equivalent of axiom (4) looks as follows ([38], page 330):
:Alive causes :Walking
In Lin's work [21, 22], we would get:
Caused(Alive; false; s)  Caused(Walking; false; s)
In McCain & Turner's approach [23, 24, 25], it would be formalized as:
:Alive) :Walking (16)
where `)' is to be read as `if :Alive, then the fact that :Walking is caused' [24]. McCain & Turner's
semantics interprets (16) as something like
:Alive(t)  Do(Walking(t); false) (17)
In the turkey example, replacing (4) by (17) does not make any dierence: it is easy to show that one
obtains exactly the same models in both cases. However, as we will see below, in general, (X  b
1
) 
Do(Y; b
2
) is not equivalent to Do(X; b
1
)  Do(Y; b
2
).
5.2 Causal Cycles
We have just seen that Do(X;true)  Do(Y;true) may often be read as `X causes Y '. As pointed
out by Sandewall and Gustafsson & Doherty [15, 33], we do not always want to reason in the `causal
direction' that is implied by the above; for example, consider the switches domain (example 4) again:
if we know that the light has been put o, we may want to conclude that (at least) one of the two
switches has been put o too. We model this as follows:
Example 6 Let T
sw;2
be as T
sw
but with the following axioms added to cons:
Do(Light(t); false)  [ Swi
1
(t)  Do(Swi
2
(t); false) ] (18)
Do(Light(t); false)  [ Swi
2
(t)  Do(Swi
1
(t); false) ] (19)
Do(Light(t);true)  Do(Swi
1
(t);true) (20)
Do(Light(t);true)  Do(Swi
2
(t);true) (21)
We show rst that if we take cons as above and do not add anything else, then we get persistence:
one easily checks that for any interpretation M with M j= cons, there is an interpretation M
0
that
interprets all variables in V[U the same way but which hasM
0
j= :Do(X
i
; b) for all X
i
and b. So the
minimization of Do in the denition of causal models will make sure that all models have :Do(X
i
; b)
for all X
i
and b. Hence eq
0
= eq for all models and all uents in our domain must persist.
Now suppose we turn on the light in an initial state with both switches o, i.e. we further add the
following axiom to cons:
Do(Light(1);true) ^ :Swi
1
(0) ^ :Swi
2
(0) (22)
Axioms (20) and (21) make sure that we have Do(F (1);true) for F 2 fSwi
1
;Swi
2
;Lightg in all
models; so eq
0
becomes F (1)  true for all these F in all models, and all models get nal state
fSwi
1
;Swi
2
;Lightg; it is easy to see that models with such a nal state indeed exist, so we get exactly
the result we wanted. What happens if we turn o the light will be discussed in example 8.
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The example above leads to a problem for some of the earlier causal approaches (i.e. those of
Gustafsson & Doherty and McCain & Turner; see [15] for the details). The reason is that in these
approaches, constructions similar to X  Do(Y;true) are used at places where one should use
Do(X;true)  Do(Y;true); see the remark at the end of section 5.1. Had we chosen the rst
possibility, axioms (11) and (12) would have been replaced by the single axiom
[ Swi
1
(t) ^ Swi
2
(t) ]  Do(Light(t);true)
while axioms (20) and (21) would have become:
Light(t)  [ Do(Swi
1
(t);true) ^ Do(Swi
2
(t);true)]
Axioms (18) and (19) would have changed similarly. But this would allow us to conclude that each
model with nal state S = fLight ; Swi
1
; Swi
2
g also has Do(F (1);true) for F equal to any of the
three uents: there is an `automatic' intervention that sets their value to true. Hence for models
with nal state S the set eq
0
in condition (2) of denition 4.3 would become F  true for all these
F and all three persistence relations would be broken. It follows that no matter what the initial state
is, there is always a model with the nal state above: there is a cycle involved in that the fact that the
light is on implies an intervention that puts both switches on, while the fact that the switches are on
implies an intervention that the light is put on. We have already seen that in our own formalization
(the one using axioms (11)-(15) and (18)-(21)) this cannot happen.
Thielscher ([38], page 329) solves the problem in a way similar to ours, but since his equiva-
lent of Do is called causes, the corresponding rules look somewhat strange: we obtain rules like
`Light causes Swi
1
', while, intuitively, turning on the light does not cause turning on the switch.
Related observations have led some authors to claim that there is more to ramication than mere
causal relationships { as stated in Gustafsson & Doherty, `physical causality is simply one of several
reasons one might set up dependencies between uents' [15].
We think that our `Pearlian' approach sheds some new light on this issue: we dene causal relations
(i.e. relations involving interventions) fully in non-causal terms; this is reected in choosing the name
Do rather than Causes for our interventions. Formulas of the form Do(A;true)  Do(B;true)
may or may not correspond to the colloquial statement `A causes B' or to any notion of `physical'
causality. The only thing we care about is how the world works at the level of detail at which we
want to formalize it - and if at that level of detail, we have Do(A;true)  Do(B;true), then we may
say that A causes B within the constraints of our domain { but if you do not like the word `causes',
you do not have to use it - the important thing about our theory is the semantics that it gives to
interventions.
6. Disjunctive Effects and Nondeterminism
Example 6 raises the interesting question of how to formalize actions whose eect is a disjunction of
uents. Recently, some authors have, either explicitly or implicitly, begun to take up this question
[25, 38]. A special case of this question concerns the more well-known issue of representing actions
with non-deterministic eects [3, 25, 34]. If an event occurs that sets the value of a proposition X to
true, where X  Y _ Z, it is not immediately clear what should happen: should we exempt both Y
and Z from persistence, or should we keep as much persistence as is logically consistent? In example 6
we implicitly chose the latter option: setting Light to false in an initial situation with both switches
on will always keep one switch in the on-position: as will be shown below, there will be no nal states
with both :Swi
1
and :Swi
2
. But is this correct, i.e. is it what we intuitively expect? A small poll
conducted by the present author reveals that people have diering intuitions about this: some think
that the position of both switches should be exempted from persistence, while others prefer the `inert
models' where there are as few changes as possible. We think that this clash of intuitions is not so
surprising in light of Pearl's theory: if we intervene to set the value of a variable X that can be
regarded as a disjunction of variables Y and Z, then we simply have an incomplete specication of our
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problem: it is not clear what should happen to the structural equations for Y and Z { should they
both be removed from the set eq, or should we remove as few equations as possible? In our view, this
may change from domain to domain. We will therefore not attempt to extend the semantics of Do to
constructions of the form Do(Y _ Z; b), but rather always make explicit what should happen to the
structural equations of Y and Z if an intervention takes place. We can do so in our causal theories
by using the assumption symbols in U (see def. 3.1). We illustrate their use by considering a domain
1
which clearly asks for eliminating all structural equations involved in the disjunction.
Example 7 We drop a pencil on a table with a piece of paper on it. As a result, the pencil may
either lie fully on the paper, or touch both part of the paper and part of the table's surface, or
touch only the table's surface. We write Touches table(t) (Touches paper(t)) i the pencil touches the
surface of the table (the paper) at time t. We can model this using a causal theory with E = fDropg,
F = fTouches table;Touches paperg, U = fU
1
; U
2
g, eq as usual and cons as follows:
:Touches table(0) ^ :Touches paper(0) (1)
Drop  [ ( Do(Touches table(1);true) ^ U
1
) _
( Do(Touches paper(1);true) ^ U
2
) ] (2)
In this case, among the models with Drop, there will be three subclasses, corresponding to the three
extensions of (U
1
; U
2
) that are consistent with (2). By the minimization of Do in denition 4.3 and
by axiom (2), we get the following interpretation for each class of models:
class corresponding interpretation of Do
U
1
^ U
2
Do(Touches table(1);true) ^Do(Touches paper(1);true)
U
1
^ :U
2
Do(Touches table(1);true) ^ :Do(Touches paper(1);true)
:U
1
^ U
2
:Do(Touches table(1);true) ^ Do(Touches paper(1);true) (3)
It follows that there will be both models where only the persistence of Touches table or Touches paper
is broken and models in which the persistence of both is broken.
Example 8 Let us now consider a case in which we want `as much persistence as possible'. Let us
say there is an intervention which sets the value of variable X where X  Y _Z. If we let X  :Light,
Y  :Swi
1
and Z  :Swi
2
, then we can see that we have already implicitly treated this case in the
extended switches domain, example
2
6. Consider a scenario in the context of that example with an
intervention setting Light to false, i.e. we add the following axiom to the set cons of T
sw;2
:
Do(Light(1); false) ^ Light(0)
We see that in the models with Swi
1
(1) and :Swi
2
(1) we have Do(Swi
2
(1); false) by axiom (18) and
:Do(Swi
1
(1); false) by the minimization of Do. For these models eq
0
contains Swi
2
(1)  false and
Swi
1
(1)  Swi
1
(0). It is now easy to see that we obtain a model with nal state f:Light;Swi
1
;:Swi
2
g.
Similarly, we can show there is a nal state with :Swi
1
and Swi
2
. But now suppose there is a
model M
0
with nal state containing :Swi
1
and :Swi
2
. By the minimization of Do, we must have
:Do(Swi
1
(1); false) and :Do(Swi
2
(1); false) in such a model. This means the set eq
0
will contain
persistence relations for both Swi
1
and Swi
2
. Since Swi
1
(0) and Swi
2
(0) must hold in all models,
we must have M
0
j= Swi
1
(1) ^ Swi
2
(1) too and we have a contradiction. So indeed only one of the
switches will change position.
1
Example 7 is an adaptation of a scenario communicated to the author by M. Thielscher.
2
We would like to stress that we do not say that the switches domain should be formalized so as to keep `as much
persistence as possible' { we formalized it this way just for illustrative purposes, and we feel that one may equally well
decide to formalize it along the lines of example 7.
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Example 9 [Exclusive Non-Deterministic Eects] The classic example of an action with a non-
deterministic eect is the tossing of a coin: if we toss a coin, it will come up either heads (Heads) or
tails, but we do not know which. However, we do know that whether or not we have Heads after tossing
is independent of the fact whether or not we had Heads before tossing, thus there is no persistence. In
light of the previous examples, this can clearly be modeled by a causal theory containing the following
cons:
Toss  [ Do(Heads(1);true)  :Do(Heads(1); false) ]
In this way, in the models for our causal theory in which a Toss-event takes place, we either have an
intervention that sets the value of Heads to true or an intervention that sets its value to false, but
not both.
7. Handling many time-points, Events and Surprises
In this section we extend our 2-point causal theories to handle arbitrarily many points in time. This
means we will have to move to a rst-order language. In the subsections to come, we rst introduce
`basic' rst-order causal theories. We then instantiate these theories in more and more complicated
ways: in section 7.2, we start with simple instantiations for handling domains in which exactly one
event happens at a time. Section 7.3 extends our theories to handle `dependent uents' which form
yet another instance of the ramication problem. Then (section 7.4) we move over to domains in
which more than one event may happen at the same time and we show how this allows us to formalize
causal chains of events. Finally, we extend our domains to handle complete surprises (section 7.6).
7.1 First-Order Causal Theories
We want to extend propositional causal theories to handle countably many points in time. It seems
that we would get an innite number of structural equations `F
i
(t + 1) = F
i
(t)', one for each uent
F
i
2 F and one for each t. This suggests using predicate logic and universally quantifying our
structural equations over time points. However, in that case Pearl's semantics gets undened: it is not
immediately clear how to perform a replacement of structural equations if the structural equations
are quantied over. But it turns out that, by changing our formalism slightly, we can mimic the
replacement of equations within causal theories. Once we have done this, the generalization to the
rst order case is completely straightforward. The general idea of this mimicking operation is as
follows: any equation in eq of the form X
i
  will be replaced by three new axioms:
[ :Do(X
i
;true) ^ :Do(X
i
; false) ]  (X
i
 )
Do(X
i
;true)  X
i
Do(X
i
; false)  :X
i
In appendix 1.2 we show that the new axioms embody exactly the same semantics as the replacement
of structural equations that was used in denition 4.3. We also show there how this enables us to
quantify over structural equations.
In the denitions below, the mimicking trick has been applied to the special case of causal theories
where the observable variables can be of two dierent kinds: events and uents - just the type of
entities we have encountered before.
Preliminaries We use a many-sorted rst-order language L . A structure M for L consists of
universes for all the sorts and interpretations for all function and predicate constants in L . For a
sort X indicated by the letter X , we write jMj
x
to denote the universe of the sort X . For a function
or predicate constant K, we write M[[K]] to denote the interpretation of K in M (which is then a
function or a set, respectively). A model of a set of sentences   is any structure M such that   is
true in M, where truth with respect to sentences is dened as usual. If M is a model of  , we write
M j=  . So from now on `j=' stands for rst-order rather than propositional entailment.
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The language L in turn depends on the sets E and F. We therefore sometimes write L(E;F).
L(E;F) contains three sorts: Booleans (variables of the sort will be denoted by b); time points (t)
and observables (x). There are two `subsorts' to observables: uents (variables of the sort denoted
by f) and events (e). We explain what we mean by `subsort' below. The set B of Boolean constants
contains two elements: B = ftrue; falseg. The set of time-point constants is N
0
= f0; 1; 2; : : :g, i.e.
the set of nonnegative integers. The set of uent constants coincides with F; the set of event constants
is identied with E. L(E;F) contains at least the following functions and predicates:
 Ho: Ho(x; t) will denote that observable x Holds at time t.
 Do: Do(x; b; t) will denote that the value of observable x at time t has been set to value b by
some (unspecied) action.
 `=,<,+' which will receive their usual interpretation.
By a `subsort' we mean the following: events and uents are really two dierent sorts. Whenever a
predicate is dened for the sort of observables, it is really dened both for the sort events and the
sort uents. Whenever in a formula we quantify over x, for example, we have the axiom 8x(x),
we implicitly quantify over elements of both constituent sorts (i.e. the axiom should be read as
8e(e) ^ 8f(f)). In what follows, we implicitly assume all those formulas that are listed without
quantiers to be universally quantied.
General First-Order Causal Theories We are now ready to dene rst-order causal theories. In
appendix 1.2, we show formally that the denitions below are indeed a straightforward extension of
the propositional causal theories dened earlier.
Denition 7.1 A rst-order causal theory for a language L(E;F) is a tuple heq;consi where
1. eq is a set of sentences for L(E;F) containing the `intervention axioms'
8x; t: Do(x;true; t)  Ho(x; t) (1)
8x; t: Do(x; false; t)  :Ho(x; t) (2)
and, in addition, one or more axioms of the form
8 x; t : [ 	(x; t) ^ :Do(x;true; t) ^ :Do(x; false; t) ]  [ Ho(x; t)  (x; t) ] (3)
Here x is a variable of sort events or uents; t is of sort time-points. We call the expression
`Ho(x; t)  (x; t)' a `structural equation'. We call 	(x; t) a `precondition' for this structural
equation.
2. cons is a set of sentences for L(E;F) containing at least uniqueness-of-names (UNA) and
domain closure (DC) axioms
3
for the sets B;E and F.
We will refer to the uniqueness-of-names axioms in cons as the `UNA-axioms' and to the domain
closure axioms as the `DC'-axioms.
We now give the denition of models for causal theories. Remember that in the propositional case,
we were looking for the minimal interpretations of the set of Do-variables within each context, i.e.
each interpretation of all other propositional variables of the theory. We will now do exactly the same
thing in a rst-order setting: now, we want the minimal interpretations of the Do-predicate for each
context. Now, a context is any interpretation of all other predicates of the theory.
3
A uniqueness-of-names (UNA) axiom for a nite set of constants X = fX
1
; : : : ;X
n
g is the formula
V
i6=j
X
i
6= X
j
.
A domain closure axiom for the set X is the axiom 8x x = X
1
_ : : : _ x = X
n
.
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This `minimization within a context' can be conveniently implemented using circumscription [18, 26].
For details about circumscription, we refer to [18]. In appendix 2 we give Lifschitz' characterization
of circumscription in model-theoretic terms. From that denition, it can be seen immediately that
circumscribing Do in cons with all other functions and predicates xed will give us exactly the models
we want: if a predicate is kept xed while circumscribing Do, each interpretation of the predicate will
serve as a context within which Do is minimized. Also, just as in the propositional case, we have
to minimize Do in cons before we add the set of structural equations eq to it { cf. the remark in
section 4.1. This is reected in the following denition. The expression Circum(cons;Do) stands for
the circumscription of Do in cons with all other functions and predicates kept xed.
Denition 7.2 a structure M for the language L is a model for the rst-order causal theory T
(written as Mj=
c
T ) i
1. M j= eq ^ Circum(cons;Do).
2. Time-points in L are interpreted as the integers; `+' and `<' are interpreted accordingly.
Note that for any causal theory T = heq;consi and any M we have that if Mj=
c
T , then also
M j= cons. Since by denition 7.1 above cons contains both UNA- and DC-axioms for B, E and F,
we easily see that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 7.1 we may assume without loss of generality that for any model M for a causal theory
T , we have
1. jMj
b
= B and jMj
e
= E and jMj
f
= F.
2. M interprets all elements in B, E and F as themselves.
We now turn to the exact kind of rules of form (3) that we will need if we want to model persistence.
Fluents are supposed to behave as before: if no intervention takes place, they persist. This is modeled
by the following axiom in eq which we call our persistence axiom:
8f; t :(t > 0) 
[ :Do(f;true; t) ^ :Do(f; false; t) ]  [ Ho(f; t)  Ho(f; t  1) ] (4)
Note that this axiom is indeed of the form prescribed by the denition of rst-order causal theories
above. Concerning events, we can opt for either one of two possibilities, The rst is reminiscent of
the way actions are treated in the standard situation calculus [27]: between each two `time points',
exactly one action happens. We can formalize this by adding an extra axiom to cons (`9!' stands for
`there exists exactly one'):
8t9!e: Ho(e; t) (5)
The formula Ho(e; t) is to be interpreted as saying that event e takes place between time t and time
t + 1. The second, more complicated possibility is to allow for multiple actions happening at the
same time; this is similar to what happens in the works of Morgenstern & Stein and Baral, Gelfond
& Provetti [5, 36]. We rst discuss the former possibility, delaying treatment of the latter until
section 7.4.
7.2 Handling Events like in the Situation Calculus
We rst extend our denition of causal theories to incorporate axioms (4) and (5).
Denition 7.3 A rst-order causal theory with persistence for the tuple hE;Fi is a tuple heq;consi
where eq and cons are sets of sentences for the language L(E;F), eq consists of intervention axioms
(1),(2) and the persistence axiom (4) while cons contains at least UNA- and DC-axioms for B;E
and F and axiom (5).
16
Example 10 [Yale Shooting Problem] Armed with this denition, we are able to handle most
standard reasoning domains involving more than two time points. As an example, consider the original
Yale Shooting domain [16]. In this domain there is a turkey that can be alive or not; there is a gun
that can be loaded or not; there is an event `load' which loads the gun, an event `wait' which has no
eects at all and an event `shoot', which, if performed when the gun is loaded, causes the turkey not
to be alive anymore. We further suppose that the turkey is alive and that the gun is unloaded at time
t = 0, and that, starting at time t = 0, someone rst loads the gun, then waits and then shoots. To
model this scenario, let T
ysp
be a causal theory with persistence for sets E = fLoad;Wait;Shootg,
F = fAlive;Loadedg. Apart from the axioms mentioned above, the set cons further contains the
following axioms:
Ho(Load; t)  Do(Loaded;true; t+ 1) (6)
Ho(Loaded; t) ^ Ho(Shoot; t)  Do(Alive; false; t+ 1) (7)
Ho(Alive; 0) ^ :Ho(Loaded; 0) (8)
Ho(Load; 0) ^ Ho(Wait; 1) ^ Ho(Shoot; 2) (9)
The original problem with the Yale Shooting Domain was that naive approaches to modeling persis-
tence end up with two classes of models: an intended one, in which the turkey is not alive anymore
at time t = 3, and an unintended one, in which the gun becomes unloaded again during the `waiting'
and hence the turkey remains alive when shot at. We will show that we only get the intended class.
To see this, notice rst that by axiom (5) we have that the only events taking place in any model
at times 0; 1 and 2 are those introduced in axiom (9). The circumscription of Do in the denition
of causal models then makes sure that in all models of T
ysp
we have :Do(Loaded; b; t) for all b and
t 2 f0; 2g. On the other hand, by axioms (9) and (6) we have Do(Loaded;true; 1) in all models, too.
It follows by axiom (1) that we have Ho(Loaded; 1) in all models and by the persistence axiom (4)
that we have Ho(Loaded; 2) in all models. Since by axiom (9) we have Ho(Shoot; 2) in all models, the
antecedent of axiom (7) holds in all models for t instantiated to 2 and we have Do(Alive; false; 3) in
all models. By axiom (4) we then have :Ho(Alive; 3) in all models for T
ysp
. It is easy to show that
such models indeed exist.
We state without proof that we also handle the related `Stanford Murder Mystery' [2]. By slightly
extending our language, we can now also deal with yet another kind of ramications - those involving
so called dependent uents. They will be introduced in the next section:
7.3 Ramications Again: Dependent Fluents
Giunchiglia and Lifschitz [11] argue that we sometimes want to express dependencies between uents
where these dependencies may be partially unknown. Let us consider Giunchiglia and Lifschitz' [11]
motivating example: suppose we are in a room with a baby, an object and a table. The object may
be dangerous to the baby (for example, it might be a hammer) but we are not sure about that. We
do know however that if the object is placed on the table, it is out of reach of the baby, and hence it
is safe. In other words, the safeness of an object depends on whether or not it is on the table, but we
do not know exactly in what way: we know it is safe if it is on the table; if it is not on the table, we
just know that this fact determines whether it is safe or not (see [11] for details). This implies that
if we put on object on the table and then remove it again, we want there to be only two possibilities:
either the object was safe both before and after it lay on the table or it was unsafe both before and
after it lay on the table. Giunchiglia and Lifschitz introduce the high-level action language ARD in
order to deal with this kind of dependencies. It turns out that causal theories can be instantiated
for `dependent uents' in a straightforward manner, the reason being that we are allowed the use of
assumption symbols (unobserved variables) in causal theories.
We rst extend our formalism by introducing the new subsort of dependent uents ; we will assume
there are a nite number of them, listed in the set D. Variables of the subsort will be indicated
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by d. Like regular uents, dependent uents may or may not persist. But unlike the situation for
regular uents, the behaviour of dependent uents is fully dened in terms of other (regular) uents
and assumption symbols. We rst extend our denitions of causal theories to deal with the subsort
of persistence. The language L(D;E;F) is as the language L(E;F) but now with dependent uents
as a new subsort of observables and with D indicating the constants of this new subsort.
Denition 7.4 A rst-order causal theory with persistence and dependent uents for the tuple
hD;E;Fi is a tuple heq;consi where eq and cons are sets of sentences for the language L(D;E;F),
eq consists of intervention axioms (1),(2) and the persistence axiom (4) while cons contains at least
UNA- and DC-axioms for B;D;E and F and axiom (5).
Note that the only dierence between causal theories as dened here and those dened as in the
previous section (denition 7.3) is the addition of UNA- and DC-axioms for dependent uents. The
new denition allows us to formalize the example described above:
Example 11 Let T
df
be a rst-order causal theory with persistence for the language L(D;E;F) con-
taining the additional 0-ary predicate U
Safe
. HereD = fSafeg, E = fPut On Table;Remove From Tableg
and F = fOn Tableg and cons contains the following additional axioms:
Ho(Put On Table; t)  Do(On Table;true; t+ 1) (10)
Ho(Remove From Table; t)  Do(On Table; false; t+ 1) (11)
Ho(Safe; t)  [ Ho(On Table; t) _ (:Ho(On Table; t) ^ U
Safe
) ] (12)
U
Safe
is called an assumption symbol. It determines the actual (but unknown) relationship between
:On Table and Safe. Suppose further that cons contains the following observations:
:Ho(On Table; 0) ^ Ho(Put On Table; 0) ^ Ho(Remove From Table; 1) (13)
Notice that (13) together with (10) and (11) make sure that we have Do(On Table;true; 1) and
Do(On Table; false; 2) in all models. The circumscription of Do in the denition of models for causal
theories makes sure that we have :Do(x; b; t) for all other x; b and t 2 f0; 1g. It follows that all models
for T
df
have
:Ho(On Table; 0) ^ Ho(On Table; 1) ^ :Ho(On Table; 2) (14)
Now in any model either U
Safe
holds or it does not. For the class of models M with :U
Safe
, we
have by (12) and (14) that M j= :Ho(Safe; 0) ^ :Ho(Safe; 2). For the class M
0
with U
Safe
, we
have M
0
j= Ho(Safe; 0) ^ Ho(Safe; 2). It immediately follows that there can be no models with
Ho(Safe; 0)  :Ho(Safe; 2). It remains to be shown that there do exist models for T
df
with U
Safe
and
models with :U
Safe
; such models can indeed easily be constructed; we omit the details. Summarizing:
Proposition 7.2 There is a model M for T
df
with M j= Ho(Safe; 0) ^ Ho(Safe; 1) ^ Ho(Safe; 2).
There is a model M
0
for T
df
with M j= :Ho(Safe; 0) ^ Ho(Safe; 1) ^ :Ho(Safe; 2). There are no
models for T
df
with any other interpretation of Ho(Safe; t) for t 2 f0; 1; 2g.
We remark that this allows us to specify what Giunchiglia and Lifschitz call `non-Markovian' theories:
the value of a uent at time t may depend on its `long-term' history, and not only on the situation in
the world at time t  1.
7.4 Minimizing Occurrence of Events
We have seen how to deal with domains in which we allow one event at a time to happen. Following
Morgenstern & Stein [28, 36], Baral, Gelfond and Provetti [3, 5] and several other authors, we would
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like to extend this to the case where more than one event may happen at a time. We want our domains
to be subject to the assumption that normally, events don't happen unless there is a specic reason
for them to happen.
It is only now that the full strength of Pearlian theories comes to light: it turns out that we can
properly model events, just like uents, using structural equations! The advantage of using structural
equations in stead of axioms in cons will become clear in section 7.5. The new structural equations
will say that `if no intervention takes place that makes an event happen, and if nothing abnormal is
the case, then the event will not happen'. The corresponding axiom in eq will look as follows:
8e; t : [ :Do(e;true; t) ^ :Do(e; false; t) ]  [ Ho(e; t)  Ab
1
(e; t) ] (15)
This uses an `abnormality predicate' Ab
1
(e; t) dened for all event-time pairs. An instantiated abnor-
mality predicate plays a role similar to the `assumption symbols' we have seen in before. But unlike
these, which represented things we were completely ignorant about, the abnormalities stand for things
we consider abnormal, or, in other words, unlikely. For this, we extend the notion of causal model to
`preferred causal model'. We always prefer those models of our theory that are the least `abnormal'.
Since in the next subsection we will encounter domains involving both rather and highly abnormal
eventualities, we need to introduce two abnormality predicates in the denition below.
Denition 7.5 A model M is a preferred causal model for causal theory T if
1. Mj=
c
T and
2. There is no other M
0
j=
c
T with M
0
[[Ab
2
]] M[[Ab
2
]] and
3. There is no other M
00
j=
c
T with M
00
[[Ab
2
]] =M[[Ab
2
]] and M
00
[[Ab
1
]] M[[Ab
1
]]
We show in appendix 1.3 that the notion of preferred models is already implicitly present in Pearl's
original theories. Having dened preferred models, we are in a position to give the denition of causal
theories with concurrent events. The only dierence to the previous denition (denition 7.4) is that
eq must now also contain the `no events'-axiom (15) while cons does not contain the `one-event-at-
a-time' axiom (5) any more.
Denition 7.6 A rst-order causal theory with persistence, dependent uents and concurrent events
for the tuple hD;E;Fi is a tuple heq;consi where eq and cons are sets of sentences for the language
L(D;E;F), eq consists of intervention axioms (1),(2), persistence axiom (4) and no-events axiom
(15) while cons contains at least UNA- and DC-axioms for B;D;E and F.
Note rst that with this denition, we still handle standard reasoning domains like the Yale Shooting
Problem. To see this, let us consider the theory T
ysp;2
which is as T
ysp
but adapted to denition 7.6:
eq now contains axioms (1),(2), (4) and (15), while cons contains UNA- and DC-axioms and addi-
tionally axioms (6){(9). One sees that the circumscription of cons rules out all models with Do(e; b; t)
for any e,b and t. It follows by axioms (15) and (9) that all models for T
ysp;2
have the abnormalities
Ab
1
(Load; 0);Ab
1
(Wait; 1);Ab
1
(Shoot; 2) (16)
Clearly, there will be no models with even more abnormalities: no more events will happen than those
we specied to happen. It is easy to check that his means that in all preferred models for T
ysp;2
, the
turkey is not alive anymore at t = 3.
It may be argued that there is nothing `abnormal' about the three events in the domain, so that
conceptually speaking, using abnormalities may not be a good way to model them. In other words,
a priori - if we have no observations about what happens in our domain - the events Ho(Load; 0),
Ho(Wait; 1), Ho(Shoot; 2) are considered abnormal. But in situations in which it is given that they
do happen (i.e. we have the additional axiom (9)), there is nothing abnormal about them any more.
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If we take a probabilistic stance towards abnormalities, then there is no problem. In this case,
`abnormal' is identied with `having small probability' and we always prefer the `most probable models'
[12]; see also appendix 1.3. A priori, the probability of each `abnormal' event is very small, so the
probability of models in which (9) and therefore, also (16) holds is very small too. But if it is given
that (9) holds, then the probability of all models becomes conditioned on (9), which implies that
the events Ho(Load; 0), Ho(Wait; 1), Ho(Shoot; 2) receive probability one: there is nothing abnormal
(unlikely) about them any more.
In our simple nonmonotonic formalism, we have no equivalent of the conditioning operator in
probability theory. If, using probability theory, we condition on an event A, then we reduce the set
of possible models to those in which A holds, but the `preference ordering' between the models in
which A holds is not changed by the conditioning: one can show using the basic rules of probability
theory that for anyM
1
andM
2
, we have that if M
1
j= A andM
2
j= A and PfM
1
g > PfM
2
g then
PfM
1
jAg > PfM
2
jAg. Hence the model M for which PfMjAg is maximal is also the model M
which maximizes PfMg within the set of models in which A holds.
This means that if we take a probabilistic view on nonmonotonic reasoning and interpret all ab-
normalities as `things that happen with small probability', then there is nothing wrong with our
minimization procedure: the models which have the least abnormalities always coincide with the
models in cons which are the most probable given all the axioms in cons.
7.5 Causal Chains of Events
To see why it makes sense to put the axiom expressing the non-occurrence of events in eq rather
than cons, we now turn to `causal chains of events'. The idea here is very simple: suppose an event
A `causes' another event B, i.e. the event A is always accompanied by an intervention that triggers
event B. Then, if the event A happens, we do not consider the event B `abnormal' any more. The
structural equation which says that `event B occurring at time t is abnormal' is replaced by another
equation that says `event B does occur at time t' - just like structural equations concerning regular
uents get replaced if an intervention takes place.
Example 12 Imagine a domain where, if you push somebody, he or she falls down a moment later.
We can formalize this using a causal theory according to denition 7.6 such that cons contains the
axiom
Ho(Push; t)  Do(Fall;true; t+ 1)
Now suppose cons further contains axiom Ho(Push; 0). From inspection of axiom (15) and the
intervention axioms (1) and (2), we see that all preferred models for this theory will have Ho(Push; 0)^
Ho(Fall; 1). But if cons had not contained Ho(Push; 0), then the preferred models would be those in
which no events at all take place.
7.6 Surprise, Surprise
What if a uent changes value while we have no event in our domain which can account for that?
This is the kind of surprise that Lifschitz and Rabinov [20] called a `miracle'. In order to deal with
it, we have to weaken our structural equations concerning regular uents: persistence may now be
broken not only by some intervention, but also by some `abnormal' (unlikely) external inuence. Thus
axiom (4) becomes the following weakened persistence axiom:
8f; t : (t > 0)  [ (:Do(f;true; t) ^ :Do(f; false; t)) 
[ Ho(f; t)  [ (Ho(f; t  1) ^ :Ab
2
(f; t)) _ (:Ho(f; t  1) ^ Ab
2
(f; t)) ] ] ] (17)
The notation (17) has been chosen so as to conform to the syntactic form (3). An equivalent, perhaps
more intuitive way of stating it is by the following two axioms, whose conjunction is equivalent to
(17):
[ (t > 0) ^ :Do(f;true; t) ^ :Do(f; false; t) ^ :Ab
2
(f; t) ]  [ Ho(f; t)  Ho(f; t  1) ]
[ (t > 0) ^ :Do(f;true; t) ^ :Do(f; false; t) ^ Ab
2
(f; t) ]  :[ Ho(f; t)  Ho(f; t  1) ]
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In other words, if no interventions and no abnormalities take place, then the value of a uent persists.
If no interventions take place and the value of the uent does not persist, then something abnormal
is the case.
Here is our updated denition:
Denition 7.7 A rst-order causal theory with persistence, dependent uents, concurrent events and
surprises for the tuple hD;E;Fi is a tuple heq;consi where eq and cons are sets of sentences for
the language L(D;E;F), eq consists of intervention axioms (1),(2), weakened persistence axiom (17)
and no-events axiom (15) while cons contains at least UNA- and DC-axioms for B;D;E and F.
We see that the only dierence to the previous denition 7.6 is that persistence axiom (4) has been
replaced by its weakened version (17). We illustrate the use of `surprises' by the following example:
Example 13 [stolen car problems] Consider two variations of the `Stolen Car Problem' [17],
modeled by theories T
sc;1
= heq;cons
1
i and T
sc;2
= heq;cons
2
i. Both are causal theories according
to def. 7.7 for the tuple hD;E;Fi with D = ;, E = fSteal Carg, F = fCar In Lotg. On top of the
UNA- and DC-axioms, cons
1
and cons
2
both contain observations:
Ho(Car In Lot; 0) ^ :Ho(Car In Lot; 10)
cons
2
contains no further axioms, while cons
1
additionally contains:
Ho(Steal Car; t)  Do(Car In Lot; false; t+ 1)
Now let t

be some element of f0; : : : ; 9g and consider a model M with
1. M j= Ho(Steal Car; t

).
2. M j= Do(Car In Lot; false; t

+ 1) and M 6j= Do(x; b; t) for any other x; b; t.
3. M j= 8f; t : :Ab
2
(f; t)
4. M j= Ho(Car In Lot; t+ 1)  Ho(Car In Lot; t) for all t except t = t

.
Clearly, M j= Circum(cons
1
;Do). It can be easily checked that M j= eq too, so Mj=
c
T
sc;1
. Since
M has no abnormalities of the Ab
2
-kind, it follows that M will be preferred over any model which
does have these. On the other hand, we have M j= Ab
1
(Steal Car; t

) but since there is no model
which has neither Ab
1
- nor Ab
2
-abnormalities it clearly follows that M is a preferred model for T
sc;1
.
In T
sc;2
things look dierent: there is no event which can account for the disappearance of the car. By
arguments similar to those above, we nd that all preferred models for T
sc;2
do have Ab
2
(Car In Lot; t)
for some t 2 f1; : : : ; 10g.
So we see that in domains where a change of uents happens for which there is an action in the
domain that accounts for it, it will preferably be assumed that this action takes place than that some
external `miracle' or `surprise' happens.
8. Comparison to Other Approaches
We now give a detailed comparison of our causal theories to three existing approaches: those of
McCain & Turner [23, 25, 24], Lin [21, 22] and Baral, Gelfond and Provetti [3, 4, 5]. Each of the
three approaches will be compared to the instantiation of our theory that is conceptually closest to it.
Hence McCain & Turner's approach, which has been specically designed to handle the ramication
problem, will be compared to our 2-point causal theories which are complex enough to deal with
ramications but which contain no additional features that would complicate the comparison. In the
same vein, Lin's approach will be compared to rst-order theories for persistence in which only one
event may happen at a time, and Baral, Gelfond & Provetti's method will be compared to the version
of our theory that minimizes occurrences of events but that does not handle surprises.
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In the case of McCain & Turner and Baral, Gelfond and Provetti we give and prove `equivalence
theorems' stating that for large classes of reasoning domains these approaches give the same results as
our causal theories do. We will also give examples of reasoning domains that fall outside these classes
for which, we claim, our approach works better than the one we are comparing it to.
In order to state our equivalence theorems we have to dene two `correspondence relations' , such
that T
A
 T
B
i domain descriptions T
A
of approach A and T
B
of approach B intuitively encode
the same domain knowledge. T
A
 T
B
should be pronounced as `theory T
A
syntactically corresponds
to theory T
B
'. In the rst correspondence relation, A will be our two-point causal theories while B
will be McCain & Turner's approach. In the second relation, A will be our rst-order causal theories
while B will be Baral, Gelfond & Provetti's approach. All approaches we consider have as their basic
objects uents and events; proving that A and B are equivalent then amounts to showing that for all
corresponding theories T
A
and T
B
(i.e. T
A
 T
B
) we have that approach A selects a model M
A
with
a particular history of what uents and events hold at what time i B selects a model M
B
with the
same interpretation of event/uent-time pairs. We will say that such models semantically correspond,
written asM
A

=
M
B
. Since for many well-formed theories of both approaches,  will not be dened,
 implicitly imposes constraints on the class of reasoning domains for which the equivalence holds.
The importance of the equivalence theorems is that they show that some approaches which at rst
glance look rather dierent from ours are actually quite similar; therefore they are also connected to
Pearl's sucient cause principle, albeit implicitly. In our comparison to Lin's [21, 22] approach, we
have not bothered to try and prove such a theorem, since it is easy to see, just by looking at the
denitions, that his approach is almost equivalent to ours.
8.1 McCain & Turner's Theory of Ramications and Qualications
Recently, McCain & Turner (MT) have introduced a `causal theory' that focuses on handling rami-
cation constraints [23, 25, 24]. We will now compare their approach to our two-point causal theories
as dened by denition 4.2 and 4.3.
MT consider theories that are triplets (S;E;C), dened for a propositional language where each
atom stands for a uent. The `state of the world' S is an interpretation for all uents. An interpretation
is denoted by the set of literals true in it. E is a set of `explicit eects', i.e. propositional combinations
of uents. Intuitively, they are the formulas that are explicitly caused to hold by some (unspecied)
action. C is a set of `causal laws' that determine the ramications of eects. MT dene the function
4

1
(S;E;C) such that it gives the set of possible states of the world after an action with eects E has
taken place in state S. The exact denition of 
1
(S;E;C) can be found in appendix 3.1; here we just
give an example of its use:
S = fAlive;Walkingg
E = f:Aliveg
C = f:Alive) :Walkingg (1)
In this case, 
1
(S;E;C) = ff:Alive;:Walkinggg i.e. the change of Alive brought about a change
of Walking. However, if we had had S
0
= f:Alive;:Walkingg, E
0
= fWalkingg, C
0
= C, then

1
(S
0
; E
0
; C
0
) would have been empty: `)' has a function similar to our `Do', enabling changes of
right-hand side uent values given changes of left-hand side values, but not the other way around
(compare this to example 3). There is one sort of domain constraint that can be expressed in MT's
approach but not in ours: MT allow eects to be any propositional combination of uents, and thus an
eect may be a disjunction of two uents. This cannot be expressed by our 2-point causal theories (we
have no construct of the form Do(X _ Y; b)). But it is exactly here that MT can give counterintuitive
results; to see this, consider the general case where there is an eect X that further causes Y _Z, and
4

1
(S;E;C) is the function McCain & Turner use in their recent paper [25]; it stands at the basis of their `Causal
Theory of Action and Change' [24]. It is a slight modication of their earlier next-state function Res
4
C
(E;S) [23]. For
the precise relation between 
1
(S;E;C) and Res
4
C
(E;S) , see [25].
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an initial state with :X;:Y and :Z:
S = f:X;:Y;:Zg
E = fXg
C = fX ) (Y _ Z)g
Proposition 8.1 
1
(S;E;C) = ffX;Y;:Zg; fX;:Y; Zgg
The proof of this proposition can be found in appendix 3.2. We have seen in example 7 of section 6
that this seems too strong in general.
Another dierence between MT's approach and ours has already been pointed out in section 5.1:
there are domain constraints that would be modeled as a single axiom A ) B in MT's approach,
while we prefer to model them using two separate axioms:
Do(A(t);true)  Do(B(t);true)
A(t)  B(t) (2)
While McCain & Turner's semantics treats `A) B' as we would treat the single axiom:
A(t)  Do(B(t);true) (3)
We have seen in section 5.2 that this is in general not the same as (2).
But if we translate constraints like A ) B indeed as (3), and we restrict ourselves to domains
without disjunctive eects, then it turns out that MT and our approach agree on all problem domains
that can be represented in the languages of both approaches. In denitions 8.1 and 8.2 (page 23)
syntactic () and semantical (

=
) correspondence for 2-point causal theories and MT's theories are
dened.  has been dened such that disjunctive eects cannot occur in corresponding theories and
such that rules of the form `A ) B' are translated into sentences of the form (3).

=
is dened such
thatM

=
(S; S
0
) i the uents that hold in S hold inM at time 0 and the uents that hold in S
0
hold
in M at time 1. As an example of how denition 8.1 works, we consider the causal theory (S;E;C)
dened by (1) at the beginning of this section. The theory described there corresponds to a 2-point
causal theory T
c
(the subscript c stands for `Causal') such that cons contains the axioms:
Alive(0) ^Walking(0) (4)
Do(Alive(1); false)
:Alive(1)  Do(Walking(1); false)
which can be seen to stem from items 3,4 and 5 of denition 8.5, respectively. eq contains
Alive(1)  Alive(0) ; Walking(1) Walking(0)
which can be seen from item 1 of the denition.
We are now ready to state our equivalence theorem, the proof of which can be found in appendix 3.3.
Theorem 8.1 For any 2-point causal theory T
c
and any domain description T
mt
= (S;E;C) such
that T
c
 T
mt
, we have:
S
0
2 
1
(S;E;C)) there exists an Mj=
c
T
c
with M

=
(S; S
0
)
Mj=
c
T
c
) 
1
(S;E;C) contains an S
0
with M

=
(S; S
0
)
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For any F
i
2 F we will sometimes write F
true
i
to denote F
i
and F
false
i
to denote :F
i
.
Denition 8.1 For any 2-point causal theory T
c
= hV;U; eq;consi for sets E and F and any
T
mt
= (S;E;C) of MT's approach we dene T
c
 T
mt
(`T
c
corresponds to T
mt
') to be true
i all of the following hold:
1. E = ;; F = fF
1
; : : : ; F
n
g; F
i
2 F i F
i
is an atom in the propositional language for which
T
mt
is dened; U = ;; eq is dened as required by def. 4.2.
2. Each sentence in cons corresponds either to S or to a sentence in E or to a sentence
in C. The set S, the sentences in E and C all correspond to a sentence in cons. Here
`correspondence' is dened as follows:
3. the sentence  
c
in cons corresponds to S (and vice versa) i  
c
is of the form F
b
1
1
(0) ^
: : : F
b
n
n
(0) and S = (F
b
1
1
; : : : ; F
b
n
n
).
Here b
i
2 B for all 1  i  n. .
4. A sentence  
c
in cons corresponds to a sentence  
mt
in E i  
c
is of the form
Do(F
i
(1); b) and  
mt
is of the form F
b
i
. Here b 2 B.
5. A sentence  
c
in cons corresponds to a sentence  
mt
in C i  
c
is of the form (m  1)
  Do(F
i
1
(1); b
1
) ^ : : : ^ Do(F
i
m
(1); b
m
) (5)
and  
mt
is of the form

0
) F
b
1
i
1
^ : : : ^ F
b
m
i
m
(6)
Here  is a propositional combination of atoms of the form F (1) where F is any element
of F. 
0
is the result of replacing all occurrences of F (1) by F . For all j, 1  i
j
 n and
b
j
2 B.
Denition 8.2 Given a model M
C
for a causal theory T
c
and a pair of states (S; S
0
) for a T
mt
with T
c
 T
mt
we say that M
C
corresponds to (S; S
0
) i for all F
i
2 F we have
M
C
j= F
i
(0), F
i
2 S and M
C
j= F
i
(1), F
i
2 S
0
24
Lin's Procedure Start with a theory T
lin
that consists of 1) unique names axioms for all actions
and uents 2) unique names and domain closure-axioms for truth-values and 3) domain-specic
axioms.
1. Add the following basic axioms for the predicate Caused to T
lin
:
Caused(f;true; s)  Ho(f; s) (7)
Caused(f; false; s)  :Ho(f; s) (8)
2. Circumscribe Caused in T
lin
with all other predicates xed. Let T
0
lin
be the resulting
theory.
3. Add to T
0
lin
the following `frame axiom' and let T
00
lin
be the resulting theory.
Poss(a; s) 
f(:Caused(f;true;Result(a; s)) ^ :Caused(f; false;Result(a; s))) 
[Ho(f;Result(a; s))  Ho(f; s)]g (9)
4. Maximize Poss in T
00
lin
to obtain the nal theory T
000
lin
.
8.2 Lin's Embrace of Causality
Lin [21, 22] has recently introduced a new method for reasoning about action that is based on a version
of the situation calculus [27]. In the situation calculus, time is modeled by situations s rather than
time points. The sort actions corresponds to our events ; however, in Lin's approach symbols of the
sort are not necessarily constants (i.e. they can be n-ary function symbols rather than only 0-ary).
Similarly, uents in situation calculus correspond to our uents, and again, Lin allows uent symbols
to be n-ary. For any action e and situation s, the function
5
Result(e; s) stands for the situation that
results when performing e in s. Ordinary situation calculus contains only the functions described above
and the predicate Ho, dened on uent-situation pairs. In addition to this, Lin uses two additional
predicates Caused and Poss.
It turns out that Lin's method is very similar to ours. We will compare it to the instantiation of
causal theories in which only one event is allowed to happen at a time (i.e. denition 7.3), since this
instantiation is conceptually closest to the situation calculus. Like us, Lin uses an additional sort
truth values ; a variable of the sort can be either true or false. Lin's Caused-predicate is ternary:
Caused(f; v; s) is true if the uent f is caused to have the truth value v in situation s. On page 24 we
give a (somewhat extended) quote of [21] which describes the method. The last step of Lin's method
is meant to deal with the qualication problem which we do not address in this paper, so it will be of
no concern to us. We rst need the following:
Proposition 8.2 If we exchange step 1 and step 2 in Lin's procedure we will arrive at an equivalent
nal theory T
000
lin
.
Proof: If we rewrite (7) and (8) as disjunctions, then Caused appears only in negated form in them.
It then easily follows from the model-theoretic characterization of circumscription (see appendix 2)
that the theory obtained by adding (7) and (8) before the circumscription has the same models as the
theory obtained by adding them after the circumscription. 2
5
The actual name for the function used by Lin is `Do' in stead of Result; we use the name Result in order to avoid
confusion with our own Do-predicate.
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Let us write eq
lin
= f(7) [ (8) [ (9)g. With this notation, step 1 and step 2 interchanged and
step 4 left out, Lin's approach can be rephrased as follows:
T
00
lin
= eq
lin
[ Circum(T
lin
;Caused) (10)
Now if we compare eq
lin
to the set of axioms eq in our denition of causal theories (def. 7.3), we see
that they are strikingly similar: Once we rename Caused to Do, (7) and (8) actually become equivalent
to our intervention axioms (1) and (2)! If we furthermore realize that Result(a; s) refers to the rst
time point considered after the time point corresponding to situation s, we see that also (9) is almost
the same as our persistence axiom (4). And most importantly, if we compare the characterization of
Lin's approach (10) to the denition of models for causal theories (def. 7.2), we see that, if eq is as
in denition 7.3, then (10) above is nearly equivalent to denition 7.2, item 1. The dierences are
that our approach uses integer time while Lin's uses situations and that our approach does not handle
the qualication problem and innite numbers of uents and events (cons contains a domain closure
axiom while T
lin
does not). On the other hand, Lin's approach does not handle the extensions
to our approach introduced after section 7.2. Otherwise, as is hopefully clear from just looking at
the respective denitions, Lin's approach is almost identical to ours. Though we have not proven it
formally, we conjecture the two approaches to be equivalent on the set of reasoning domains for which
both are dened.
Interestingly, in Lin's papers neither the choice to keep Ho xed during circumscription of Caused,
nor the choice to add the persistence axiom only after this rst circumscription is motivated in terms
much other than `if you do not do it, you get counterintuitive results'. Our work thus provides
an external motivation for these choices, cf. the remarks in section 4: the axioms (7)-(9) can be
interpreted as mimicking the replacement of structural equations. This replacement can only be done
properly if the right interpretations of Do have been obtained already for each particular interpretation
of Ho. Note also that, for the `replacement' to happen correctly, it is not crucial that the intervention
axioms are added after the circumscription of cons (which is why Lin can add his version of them to
T
lin
before circumscribing). It is however crucial that the persistence axiom is only added after the
circumscription. Otherwise, as can be easily seen from the persistence axiom (4), we would infer that
in each model with :[Ho(F; t   1)  Ho(F; t)] for some uent F , we would have Do(F; b; t) for some
b. Thus any change would automatically be accompanied by an intervention, and we would select
models with spurious changes.
8.3 Baral and Gelfond
We now undertake the most dicult and extensive comparison: we compare our approach to Baral
and Gelfond's (BG) approach based on the action description language L
3
[3]. L
3
is an extension
of Baral, Gelfond and Provetti's language L
1
[5] which in turn is an extension of Lifschitz' language
A [10, 34]. L
3
extends A to deal with concurrent actions, actions with non-deterministic eects and
observations of the actions that take place and the uents that hold in arbitrary situations. On the
other hand, it cannot at all deal with ramications. The way it treats concurrent actions is similar to
the way we treat events: BG always prefer the models of a domain in which as few actions as possible
take place. Otherwise, at least on the surface, BG's approach looks quite dierent from ours. It is
denitely not based on Pearl's ideas. Still, it turns out to be equivalent to our approach on most
reasoning domains for which both approaches are dened.
BG's approach consists of domain descriptions D written in the language L
3
. We will compare
BG's approach to our instantiation of causal theories in which concurrent events are allowed to happen
but surprises are not, i.e. we use denition 7.6. The comparison will follow the same pattern as the
comparison to MT's approach did: we rst give an example of a reasoning domain where our approach
gives better results than BG's does. We will then dene syntactical and semantical correspondence
relations and provide a theorem stating that, for the subset of possible reasoning domains for which
the syntactical correspondence relation is dened, corresponding theories have corresponding models.
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We rst have to explain the basics of BG's approach though. For more details we refer to [3] and
especially to the much more extended [5]. Strictly speaking, the latter reference is about L
1
and not
L
3
, but L
3
is only a minor extension of L
1
.
Review of L
3
BG's approach consists of domain descriptions D written in a language L
3
. If a
domain description D is consistent, then it has models M which determine what uents hold at what
time and what actions happen when. L
3
consists of the sets of symbols F (corresponding to our
uents), A (`unit actions', corresponding to our events) and S (`situations', corresponding to states
of the world at specic points in time). S contains two special situations s
0
and s
N
: the initial and
current situation. A uent literal is a uent possibly preceded by :. By a generalized action a, BG
mean a disjunction of arbitrary sets of unit actions: a = a
1
j : : : ja
m
(m  1); a
i
= fa
i1
; : : : ; a
in
g for
1  i  n. Each a
i
is called a compound action and interpreted as a set of actions which are performed
concurrently and which start and stop contemporaneously. If a generalized action is performed, this
means that one of the constituent compound actions is performed and it is not known which.
Domain descriptions D in L
3
may contain several kinds of rules. First, there are eect laws of the
form
a causes f if p
1
; : : : ; p
n
where a is a compound action and f; p
1
; : : : ; p
n
(n  0) are uent literals. This should be read as `f is
guaranteed to be true after the execution of an action a in any state of the world in which p
1
; : : : ; p
n
are true'.
Second, there are uent facts of the form f at s where f is a uent literal and s is a situation. This
should be read as `f is observed to be true in situation s'.
Third, there are occurrence facts which are expressions of the form  occurs at s where  is a
sequence of generalized actions and s is a situation. This says that `the sequence  of actions was
observed to have occurred in situation s'.
Fourth, there are precedence facts of the form s
1
precedes s
2
. This states that situation s
1
occurred
before s
2
.
The three kinds of facts introduced above are called atomic. A fact is a propositional combination
of atomic facts
6
.
An interpretation M = (	;) for a domain description D contains a `situation assignment'  and
a `causal interpretation' 	.
A situation assignment is a mapping from S to sequences of actions, such that 1) (s
0
) = [] ([]
denotes the empty sequence) and 2) for every s
i
2 S, (s
i
) is a prex of (s
n
). Intuitively,  denes
an `action schedule': it says which actions happen in between which situations. A causal interpretation
	 maps sequences of actions to `states'. A state  is an interpretation of all uents, denoted by the
set of uents that are interpreted to be true. Hence (s) denotes the sequence of actions that have
led to situation s, and 	((s)) denotes the set of uents that hold in situation s.
If all the rules of a domain description D are true in an interpretation M , we call M a model of
D. The denition a a rule `being true in interpretation M ' is relatively straightforward; the only
complication arises in the case of several actions with contradictory eects that take place at the same
time { and it is precisely here that BG's approach can give unintuitive results, see below. The precise
denition of `truth in a model' and of modelhood can be found in appendix 4.1.
A Distinguishing Example We will see that for most of the domains expressible in both formalisms,
BG and our causal theories give the same results. However, in domains involving specicity, BG and
our approach give dierent results, and we claim that for these domains, BG gives the less intuitive
ones. The default assumption of specicity says that `more specic information about actions overrides
less specic information'. We illustrate this using a standard example [37]: suppose that if you lift a
6
There is one extra kind of rule in L
3
, the hypothesis. Hypotheses however cannot occur in domain descriptions D
and will therefore be of no concern to us.
27
bowl of soup with either your left or your right hand, but not both, then you will spill the soup and
the table will get wet. If you lift the bowl with both hands however, then you will not spill the soup.
BG formalize this using the following domain description D, containing only two situations s
0
and
s
N
:
fLift leftg causes Wet (11)
fLift rightg causes Wet (12)
fLift left;Lift rightg causes :Wet if :Wet (13)
BG now formalize the assumption of specicity as follows: if the preconditions of (13) hold, then rules
(11) and (12) are ignored when determining the eects of Lift left and Lift right { see the paragraph
on `causal models' in appendix 4.1 for details on how this is achieved.
Now in this simple example BG's approach works well. However, suppose your table is placed in
your garden, where there is also a sprinkler very near to your table, obeying the following additional
rule:
Turn on sprinkler causes Wet (14)
Now consider a situation in which your table is dry. If in this situation you lift the soup bowl with
both hands while somebody else turns on the sprinkler, then the result according to BG's approach
turns out to be undened! More formally, suppose we have the additional facts
s
0
precedes s
N
^ :Wet at s
0
^
[fTurn on sprinkler;Lift left;Lift rightg] occurs at s
0
(15)
Proposition 8.3 In any model M for D = f(11) { (15)g it remains undened what uents hold and
what not in situation s
N
.
The proof of this proposition can be found in appendix 4.2.
One should stress that there is nothing wrong with `specicity' in itself! From our point of view,
specicity just says that, just as you assume that `no events happen in general' when determining your
set of models, you may already assume it in your specication of eect axioms; we just did not build
in this feature in our causal theories. The real problem lies in the inappropriate use of causes in (13):
there is denitely no sucient cause for not getting wet if you lift the soup bowl with two hands:
no intervention that sets the value of Wet is performed. However, causes does receive a semantics
in BG's approach as if it would always represent an intervention. From a Pearlian point of view, it
comes as no surprise that this may lead to counterintuitive results.
Because we do not feature specicity, we would have to formalize (11) as
Ho(Lift left; t) ^ :Ho(Lift right; t)  Do(Wet;true; t+ 1) (16)
and (12) accordingly. (13) would then simply disappear. If the sprinkler were turned on, then
according to the denition of models for causal theories (def. 7.2), you would denitely get Wet.
Correspondence and Equivalence We will see that BG's approach and ours are equivalent on all do-
mains for which both are dened except those involving specicity. In this section we rst dene
syntactic () and semantic (

=
) correspondence, and we then provide a theorem stating that syntac-
tically corresponding theorems yield semantically corresponding models. However, before we can do
all this, we have to take care of four technical problems that arise. We consider each of these in turn:
 First, we have to rule out domain descriptions D such as the above which may involve specicity
and which thus may be handled dierently by the two approaches. These are the ambiguous D:
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Denition 8.3 If a domain description D in the language L
3
contains two eect laws
a causes f if p
1
; : : : ; p
n
and a
0
causes :f if p
0
1
; : : : ; p
0
m
(17)
where 1) a\ a
0
6= ; or a = ; or a
0
= ; and 2) fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g\ f:p
0
1
; : : : ;:p
0
m
g = ; then D is said
to be ambiguous.
The exclusion of ambiguous domain descriptions will be echoed in condition (b) of theorem 8.2
below.
 Another problem is that in BG's approach, there exist domain descriptions D for which a model
M does exist, but the model is such that, for all states of the world after some particular
point in time, it is undened what uents hold in them (proposition 8.3 illustrates this; there
is a model for D, but it is undened what happens in there). From our point of view, such a
model containing undened states is simply not a model at all, and we have to dene semantical
correspondence `

=
' such that no model of our approach corresponds to it. This will be echoed
in condition (a) of the denition of `semantical correspondence' (def. 8.6).
 The third problem is that the denition of modelhood comes in two versions in BG's papers
[5]. In one of the two versions, logically consistent initial states are never ruled out, even if
this would lead to models in which more actions occur than is strictly necessary. In the other
version only the models with a minimal number of actions are selected. Since in our approach
we always prefer the models with the least number of events (i.e. the smallest, in the subset
sense, interpretations of Ab
1
), our approach should clearly be compared to the second version.
We therefore assume, in the following, that whenever we speak of a model of BG's approach,
we mean a model according to the second version of the denition of modelhood { this second
version is the denition given in appendix 4.1.
 The fourth problem is that BG use names for situations. In order to create corresponding
theories, we need names for our time points, too. The denition of our language L(D;E;F) does
not allow for this. We therefore have to extend denition 7.6 in the following straightforward
way:
Denition 8.4 A rst-order causal theory T
c
= heq;consi for a language L(D;E;F;T)
(where T is a nite set of constants) is a rst-order causal theory with persistence, dependent
uents and concurrent events (i.e. a theory according to denition 7.6 for the tuple hD;E;Fi
extended with the constants in T). These constants are all of sort time points.
Notice that the denition of models for causal theories (denition 7.2) makes sure that the
constants in T, which we will call time names, will always be interpreted as nonnegative inte-
gers. Whenever in the following we speak of T
c
, we mean a theory T
c
dened according to
denition 8.4 above.
Having taken care of these problems, we are ready to dene syntactic correspondence. This is done in
denition 8.5 on page 29. As an example of how that denition works, we will give a simple domain
description and a causal theory that corresponds to it. For this, let D be the domain description
consisting of (11), (12),(14) and (15). This is just the soup-bowl domain we considered before but
without the malfunctioning specicity axiom (13). According to denition 8.5, this domain is equiv-
alent to a causal theory T
c
with an eq containing the standard two intervention axioms and our
persistence and no-events axiom (15), and a cons containing UNA- and DC-axioms and on top of
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For uents F
i
2 F we use the following notation: when occurring in a formula of L
3
, F
true
i
should be read as F
i
; F
false
i
should be read as :F
i
. When occurring in a sentence of cons,
Ho(F
true
i
; t) should be read as Ho(F
i
; t); Ho(F
false
i
) should be read as :Ho(F
i
; t).
Denition 8.5 For any theory T
c
for a language L(D;E;F;T) and domain description D for
a language L
3
= (F ;A;S), we dene T
c
 D ( `T
c
corresponds to D') to hold i all of the
following hold:
1. constants 1) D = ;, 2) E = A; 3) F = F = fF
1
; : : : ; F
n
F
g; 4) T = S; and 4) s
0
; s
N
2 S.
2. general axioms eq is as required by denition 8.4. cons contains UNA- and DC- axioms for
E;F and B and the additional axiom s
0
= 0.
3. sentences Each sentence in cons that is not equal to one of the sentences mentioned under
item 2. above, corresponds to either an eect law or a fact in D. Each eect law and each
fact in D corresponds to a sentence in cons. Here `correspondence' is dened as follows:
4. eect laws A sentence  
c
corresponds to an eect law L in D i  
c
is of the form
8t:[ Ho(F
b
1
j
1
; t) ^ : : : ^ Ho(F
b
m
j
m
; t) ^ Ho(a
1
; t) ^ : : : ^ Ho(a
n
; t) ]  Do(F
i
; b; t+ 1) (18)
while L is of the form:
fa
1
; : : : ; a
n
g causes F
b
i
if F
b
1
j
1
; : : : ; F
b
m
j
m
(19)
5. uent facts A sentence  
c
corresponds to a uent fact F in D i  
c
is of the form `Ho(f; s)'
while F is of the form `f at s'.
6. occurrence facts A sentence  
c
corresponds to an occurrence fact O in D i O is of the
form `[a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] occurs at s', where n > 0, a
i
= a
i1
j : : : j a
im
i
, a
ij
= fa
1
ij
; : : : ; a
k(i;j)
ij
g,
a
k(i;j)
ij
2 A, while  
c
is of the form:
[ H(a
11
; s) _ : : : _ H(a
1m
1
; s) ] ^
[ H(a
21
; s) _ : : : _ H(a
2m
2
; s) ] ^
.
.
.
^ [ H(a
n1
; s+ n  1) _ : : : _ H(a
nm
n
; s+ n  1) ] (20)
where H(a
ij
; s) is short for Ho(a
1
ij
; s) ^ : : : ^Ho(a
k(i;j)
ij
; s).
7. precedence facts A sentence  
c
corresponds to a precedence fact P in D i  
c
is of the
form `s
1
< s
2
' while P is of the form `s
1
precedes s
2
'.
8. non-atomic facts A sentence  
c
corresponds to a fact F i  
c
is a propositional combina-
tion of constituents that each correspond to an atomic fact and F is the same propositional
combination of the corresponding atomic facts.
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Consider an interpretation M = (	;) of a domain description D in L
3
= (F ;A;S). (s
N
) can
be written as a (possibly empty) sequence of compound actions (here last 2 N
0
):
(s
N
) = [a
0
; a
1
; : : : ; a
last
]
Similarly, we can write for all s 2 S: (s) = [a
0
; : : : ; a
t
] with t  last. For t > last we dene a
t
to be the empty set. We dene [a
 1
] to be equal to the empty sequence []. Using this convention,
for 0  t  last + 1, we dene 
t
as an abbreviation for 	([a
0
; : : : ; a
t 1
]). For t > last + 1, 
t
is
dened to be equal to 
last+1
.
Denition 8.6 For any T
c
for a language L(D;E;F;T) and any non-ambiguous domain descrip-
tion D for a language L
3
= (F ;A;S) such that T
c
 D, let M = (	;) be any interpretation of
(F ;A;S) and M be any interpretation of our language. We say that M corresponds toM (written
as `M

=
M') i a) 	((s
N
)) is dened; b) M interprets all time points as integers and `+' and
`<' accordingly; and c) for all f 2 F ; a 2 A and s 2 S and all t 2 N
0
:
1. a 2 a
t
,M j= Ho(a; t)
2. f 2 
t
,M j= Ho(f; t)
3. (s) contains exactly t elements ,M j= s = t
that the axioms:
s
0
= 0
Ho(Lift left; t)  Do(Wet;true; t+ 1)
Ho(Lift right; t)  Do(Wet;true; t+ 1)
Ho(Turn on sprinkler; t)  Do(Wet;true; t+ 1)
(s
0
< s
N
) ^ :Ho(Wet; s
0
)^
[ Ho(Turn on sprinkler; s
0
) ^ Ho(Lift left; s
0
) ^ Ho(Lift right; s
0
) ] (21)
Here the rst axiom is introduced by item 2 of the denition; the second, third and fourth axioms
are introduced by items 3 and 4 of the denition and the fth axiom is introduced by item 8 of the
denition. Item 6 of denition 8.5 deserves special attention: it translates any rule in D of the form
`[a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] occurs at s' into an axiom in cons which expresses that a
1
should hold at time point
s, a
2
at time point s+ 1 etc. In other words, if, in BG's formalism, several actions [a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] take
place sequentially in a situation s, we interpret this as saying, in our formalism, that the rst of them
happens at the point in time t corresponding to s, the second to the point in time directly thereafter
etc. Any situation s
0
such that s precedes s
0
in BG's formalism will therefore be mapped to a point
in time t
0
that is suciently larger than t so as to allow for all the actions [a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] to happen in
between t and t
0
.
The semantical correspondence relation `

=
' is introduced in denition 8.6 on page 30. Just above
that denition, we introduce the notation a
t
to stand for the (t+1)-th compound action taking place
in an interpretation M . Similarly, 
t
stands for the state of the world (i.e. the set of all uents that
hold) just before the (t + 1)-th compound action takes place. In the denition itself, it is checked
whether for any set of actions denoted by a
t
, the same actions take place inM at time t; 
t
is treated
similarly.
Having discussed both syntactic and semantical correspondence, we are now ready to state our theo-
rem. The proof can be found in appendix 4.3.
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Theorem 8.2 For any theory T
c
for a language L(D;E;F;T) and any domain description D for a
language L
3
of Baral and Gelfond's such that a) T
c
 D and b) D is not ambiguous, we have:
M = (	;) is a model for D such that 	((s
N
)) is dened)
there exists an M with M

=
M such that M is a preferred model of T
c
and we further have
M is a preferred model of T
c
) there exists a model M for D such that M

=
M
9. A Brief Note on Other Approaches based on Pearl's ideas
There have been several earlier papers on common-sense reasoning about action that were (partially)
based on Pearl's ideas; we mention the papers of Darwiche and Pearl [7, 8], Boutilier and Goldszmidt
[6] and Gener [9]. However, in the works of Darwiche, Pearl, Boutilier and Goldszmidt actions are
not directly treated as interventions, but rather compiled into nodes in a causal graph (in Darwiche
and Pearl's case) or a Bayesian Network (in Boutilier and Goldszmidt's case). The resulting theories
then are quite dierent from ours in that they lack the Do-operator, which is fundamental to our
solution of the ramication problem. Only the approach of Gener is able to handle comparable
instances of the ramication problem. We plan a more in-depth comparison to Gener's approach in
future work.
Earlier, the present author has introduced the two model selection criteria S
0
and I
0
[14, 13] which
were claimed to be based on Pearl's causal graphs. However, the connection was not investigated
in detail. The present report can be seen as an extension of this original work, but now with the
connection worked out in full detail (see appendix 1). Putting the theory in a form that makes as
explicit as possible the connection to Pearl's work has caused the causal theories discussed in this
paper to look { supercially { quite dierent from S
0
and I
0
.
10. Conclusion
We have shown that by extending Pearl's causal theories we arrive at a powerful approach to common
sense reasoning about action and change. We had to extend Pearl's theory at several places; however,
the basic idea behind Pearl's theory, i.e. the sucient cause principle, remained unchanged. The
main ingredient of our causal theories is the Do-operator, which allows us to express any propositional
combinations of observations (in the propositional case, these are elements of V; in the rst-order
case, instances of Ho) and interventions (instances of Do). Several existing approaches employ a
`causes'-construct which has a semantics similar to our Do, but usually, this construct cannot be
freely combined with observations (see for example [5, 11, 23, 38]). It is this freedom that makes the
representational power of our formalism go beyond most existing ones.
In future work, we would like to make a more extensive comparison between our approach and that
of Thielscher [38]. Apart from Pearl, Thielscher is one of the few authors in the eld who tries to make
completely clear what he means by a causal law, i.e. he attempts to give a semantics to statements
of the form `A causes B' in non-causal terms. Interestingly, Thielscher's is also the only approach we
are aware of that can correctly handle reasoning domains for which our approach fails ([38], example
18). On the other hand, our use of Do is much less restrictive than Thielscher's use of causes. We
plan to study the exact dierences between Thielscher's and our approach in the near future.
Another approach that deserves further attention is the one based on Sandewall's and Doherty's
occlusion concept [34, 33, 15]. Especially the way it is used by Gustafsson and Doherty [15] is strongly
reminiscent of Lin's use of the Caused-predicate and thus also related to our use of Do. Even more
interestingly, the underlying idea behind occlusion is similar to Pearl's ideas about interventions: in
Sandewall, Gustafsson and Doherty's work, if a uent is aected by some action, then it becomes
occluded for the duration of the action, which means that its value becomes independent of the value
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it had directly before the action started. Compare this to the sucient cause principle: if an action
takes place that sets the value of some uent, then the uent becomes independent of the values of
any variables in the domain which normally inuence it. We see that the two concepts are closer than
their names suggest and we think that they should be compared in detail.
This brings us once again to what may be the most interesting aspect of our approach: it may
help bridge the conceptual gap between `causal' and `non-causal' approaches. Seen in this light, the
remark at the end of section 5.2 is probably the most important part of the paper.
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1. Appendix: From Pearl's Causal Theories to Ours
In this section we show how exactly to extend Pearl's causal theories in order to arrive at ours. We
use the version of Pearl's theories introduced in [31, 32]. We rst give Pearl's original denitions.
We then show how a set of global constraints cons is introduced; this gives us a new kind of causal
theories that, though already more general than Pearl's, are nevertheless still essentially propositional.
In subsection 1.1 we show that they are equivalent to the propositional causal theories used in the
main text. In subsection 1.2 we show how to extend them further to rst-order causal theories. In
subsection 1.3 we show how the notion of `preferred model' is already implicit in causal theories.
1.1 Propositional Causal Theories
Here is the denition of causal theories as given by Pearl [31, 32]:
Denition 1.1 A causal theory T is a 4-tuple T = hV;U; P (u); ff
i
gi where
1. V = fX
1
; : : : ; X
n
g is a set of observed variables
2. U = fU
1
; : : : ; U
m
g is a set of unobserved variables which represent disturbances, abnormalities
or assumptions.
3. P (u) is a distribution over U
1
; : : : ; U
m
, and
4. ff
i
g is a set of n deterministic functions, each of the form
X
i
= f
i
(X
1
; : : : ; X
n
; U
1
; : : : ; U
m
) (1)
Usually, causal theories come together with one or more actions of the form Do(X
i
; x). In the following,
we assume that fX
i
1
; : : : ; X
i
l
g is an arbitrary subset of the variables V and that for all 1  k  l, x
k
is a value in the domain of X
i
k
. Here is how Pearl denes the eect of actions [31, 32]:
Denition 1.2 (Eect of actions) The eect of the set of actions
A = fDo(X
i
1
; x
1
);Do(X
i
2
; x
2
); : : : ;Do(X
i
l
; x
l
)g
on a causal theory T is given by a subtheory T (A) of T , where T (A) obtains by deleting from T all
equations corresponding to the X
i
k
occurring in A and substituting the equations X
i
k
= x
k
instead.
The denition of models for causal theories is straightforward:
Denition 1.3 A valuation M for the variables in V [U belonging to a causal theory T is called a
model of T i all of the equations (1) associated with T hold in M. A valuation M is called a model
for the causal theory T and the set of actions A i M is a model for T (A), where T (A) is dened as
in def. 1.2.
It is often assumed [32] that the set of equations (1) has a unique solution for X
i
; : : : ; X
n
, given any
value of the disturbances U
1
; : : : ; U
m
; in other words, each set of values for the disturbances determines
a unique model for T . Therefore the distribution P (u) induces a unique distribution on the set of
variables U [V, or, equivalently, on the set of models : a model M such that U
1
= u
1
; : : : ; U
m
= u
m
will receive probability PfMg = PfU
1
= u
1
; : : : ; U
m
= u
m
g. We can dene the notion of preferred
model in terms of its probability:
Denition 1.4 For any causal theory T , any valuation M of the variables in V [U with maximum
probability PfMg will be called a preferred model for the causal theory.
We will use `preferred models' only in section 1.3. For now we just look at plain models for causal
theories, i.e. we do not care about the distribution P (u). In that case, the assumption that the set of
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equations (1) has a unique solution for X
i
; : : : ; X
n
, given any value of the disturbances U
1
; : : : ; U
m
is
not needed.
We refer to causal theories as dened above as Pearlian or basic causal theories. Causal theories
which are such that all the variables in V and U are propositional will be called propositional. For
simplicity, we will focus on these propositional theories when dening our extension. Here it is:
Denition 1.5 An extended propositional causal theory T
EP
is a 5-tuple
T
EP
= hV;U; P (u); ff
i
g;consi
such that
1. hV;U; P (u); ff
i
gi is a propositional basic causal theory as dened in def. 1.1.
2. cons, the set of constraints, is a nite set of propositional formulas over variables V [U [ A(V).
Here A(V) is dened as the set of propositional variables
fDo(X
i
;true);Do(X
i
; false) j X
i
2 Vg
For any extended propositional causal theory T
EP
= hV;U; P (u); ff
i
g;consi, the associated basic
causal theory will be called T

EP
. If all the constraints in cons hold for a valuationM of the variables
in V [U[A(V) we will write M j= cons. Notice that a T
EP
is just a causal theory together with a
set of formulas that may directly involve interventions. For such theories, we also need to extend the
denition of models. The idea here is that we want to make sure that the axioms in cons hold for all
models of causal theories while still, the sucient cause principle dictates how interventions should
be handled.
Denition 1.6 A model for an extended causal theory T
EP
= hV;U; P (u); ff
i
g;consi is a valuation
M for the variables in V [U [ A(V) such that
1. M j= cons
2. The restriction of M to the variables in V [U is a model of the basic causal theory T

EP
(A).
Here T

EP
(A) is the eect of the set of actions A on the basic causal theory T

EP
, where
A = fDo(X
i
; x) j M j= Do(X
i
; x); X
i
2 V; x 2 Bg
A preferred model for T
EP
is dened as a valuation M for variables in V [U [ A(V) such that 1)
M j= cons and 2) the restriction of M to V [U is a preferred model of T

EP
(A).
Note that the set A in item 2 of this denition depends on the model M, i.e. it can be dierent for
dierent M. Now for any extended causal theory T
EP
= hV;U; P (u); ff
i
g;consi, let T
0
EP
be the
theory that results from deleting from T
EP
all functions f
i
in ff
i
g of the form X
i
= U where U is
some element of U. It is easy to see the following:
Proposition 1.1 M is a model for T
EP
i M is a model for T
0
EP
.
Hence as long as we work with extended propositional theories, we do not have to worry about
specifying functions f
i
for all the X
i
2 X { if an f
i
is left out, it just means that we are indierent
about the corresponding X
i
. But now notice that, since we are working with propositional variables,
we can replace the equality sign `=' in the structural equations (1) by logical equivalence `' without
changing their meaning. From this, together with the proposition (1.1) above and the denition of
eects (def. 1.2) it immediately follows that the denitions of extended propositional causal theories
T
EP
and their models (denitions 1.5 and 1.6, resp.) are completely equivalent to the denitions of
causal theories and models given in the main text (denitions 3.1 and 3.2, resp.). This shows how the
denitions in the main text arise as natural extensions of Pearl's denitions.
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1.2 From propositional to rst-order causal theories
A potential diculty with propositional causal theories T = hV;U; eq;consi is the fact that their
models are dened by performing syntactic operations on T - some of the equations in eq get replaced,
depending on the axioms in cons. It would be convenient if we could express these syntactic operations
as axioms within eq itself. A model for a causal theory for which eq is extended with such axioms
would then simply be a valuationM withM j= eq[cons, where `j=' denotes ordinary propositional
entailment. It turns out that eq can indeed be extended with such axioms, and moreover, we nd
that this is exactly what we need to extend our theories to the rst-order case.
A Reformulation of Propositional Causal Theories We rst give a reformulation of propositional
causal theories that is equivalent with the original denition but in which the replacement of axioms
is avoided in the way indicated above:
For any causal theory T = hV;U; eq;consi dened according to denition 3.1, let T
0
be the
propositional theory over variables U[V [A(V ) such that T
0
= cons[ eq
new
. Here eq
new
results
from eq by replacing any structural equation X
i
  in eq by the following three axioms:
[ :Do(X
i
;true) ^ :Do(X
i
; false) ]  (X
i
 ) (2)
Do(X
i
;true)  X
i
(3)
Do(X
i
; false)  :X
i
(4)
Here the rst axiom represents the original structural equation: if no interventions take place, then
X
i
should still be equivalent to . The second and third axioms represent the eect of actions.
Theorem 1.1 For any causal theory T and propositional theory T
0
obtained from T as described
above, we have
M is a model for causal theory T ,M j= T
0
Proof: ()) SupposeM is a model for causal theory T . Then, according to denition 3.2,M j= cons.
It remains to be shown that M j= eq
new
. For this, let rst  be any axiom in eq
new
of form (2).
Notice that eq must contain the structural equation S = `X
i
 
0
. Either M j= :Do(X
i
;true) ^
:Do(X
i
; false) or not. In the latter case M j=  trivially. In the former case, eq
0
in denition 3.2
must clearly contain structural equation S to. SinceM j= eq
0
, we haveM j= S and thereforeM j= 
and we are done.
Now let  be any axiom in eq
new
of form (3). If M 6j= Do(X
i
;true) we are done, so let us
suppose M j= Do(X
i
;true). In this case, eq
0
in denition 3.2 contains the structural equation
S = `X
i
 true
0
. Since M j= eq
0
, we have M j= S and therefore M j=  and we are done.
In the same way one can show that M j=  for any  in eq
new
of form (4).
(() Suppose M j= T
0
. Then M j= cons so condition 1 of denition 3.2 is satised. It remains to be
shown that M j= eq
0
where eq
0
is obtained form eq as in condition 2 of denition 3.2.
For this, note there are two kinds of axioms in eq
0
: those of form X
i
 b for some X
i
2 V and
b 2 B and those of form X
i
=  for some X
i
2 V. We will show that for any  in eq
0
of either
of the two kinds, M j= . If  is an axiom of the rst kind, then, by denition 3.2, we must have
M j= Do(X
i
; b). But then, since M j= eq
new
and eq
new
contains (the proper instances of) axioms
(3) and (4), we also have M j= (X
i
 b) and hence also M j= .
If  is of the second kind, then, by denition 3.2, we must haveM j= :Do(X
i
;true)^:Do(X
i
; false).
But then, sinceM j= eq
new
and eq
new
contains (the proper instance of) axiom (2), we haveM j= 
too. 2
Quantifying over Structural Equations Let us suppose for the moment that we want to use causal
theories for persistence involving n+1 points in time. Theorem 1.1 shows that in this case, all axioms
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in eq can equivalently be represented by a set eq
new
which contains:
:Do(F
i
(1);true) ^ :Do(F
i
(1); false)  (F
i
(1)  F
i
(0))
:Do(F
i
(2);true) ^ :Do(F
i
(2); false)  (F
i
(2)  F
i
(1))
.
.
.
:Do(F
i
(n);true) ^ :Do(F
i
(n); false)  (F
i
(n)  F
i
(n  1))
(5)
for all F
i
2 F, with corresponding axioms
Do(F
i
(t); b)  (F
i
(t)  b)
for all F
i
2 F; b 2 B and t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng.
It is now evident that this scheme of axioms can be extended to a countably innite number of
time points by universally quantifying over both groups of axioms and letting F
i
(t) denote a predicate
involving object t rather than an atomic propositional variable. We thus end up with two groups of
axioms. First,
8t > 0 : :Do(F
i
(t);true) ^ :Do(F
i
(t); false)  (F
i
(t)  F
i
(t  1)) (6)
for all F
i
2 F and second
8t : Do(F
i
(t);true)  (F
i
(t)  true)
8t : Do(F
i
(t); false)  (F
i
(t)  false) (7)
Axioms of form (6) will be called structural equation axioms. Notice that they really contain an
innitude of structural equations! Axioms of form (7) will be called intervention axioms.
In theories for temporal reasoning domains it will be useful not only to quantify over time points but
also over uents. This can easily be accomplished by treating F
i
as an object rather than a predicate
constant, introducing a new predicate Ho and writing Ho(F
i
; t) in stead of F
i
(t), a usual practice in
common-sense temporal reasoning.
1.3 Preferred Models of Causal Theories
For simplicity, we consider extended propositional causal theories again as dened in appendix 1.1,
denitions 1.5 and 1.6. For the moment we assume that the set of equations (1) has a unique solution
for X
i
; : : : ; X
n
, given any value of the disturbances U
1
; : : : ; U
m
; in other words, given a causal theory
T , each set of values for the disturbances determines a unique model for T . Taking a probabilistic
stance towards reasoning under uncertainty (as, for example, in [12]) we assume that the distribution
P (u) represents which external inuences we consider `abnormal' and which external inuences we are
completely ignorant about. Having specied such a distribution P (u), we always prefer the models
which are the most probable according to P (u), in accordance with denition 1.4. We get a particularly
simple case if we assume that U can be partitioned into two subsets: variables standing for unlikely
or abnormal occurrences (having small probability) and variables standing for external inuences we
are ignorant about (having probability 1=2). We call P (u)'s for which this holds simple:
Denition 1.7 For any extended propositional causal theory T
EP
, we call the associated P (u) simple
if U and P (u) are such that:
 U can be partitioned as follows: U = Ind [Ab
 P (u) is dened as follows:
{ All variables in U are independent: for all U
1
; U
2
2 U, P (U
1
^ U
2
) = P (U
1
)  P (U
2
).
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{ for all Ind 2 Ind, P (Ind = true) = P (Ind = false) = 1=2.
{ for all Ab 2 Ab, P (Ab = true) = 
Ab
. Here 0 < 
Ab
< 1=2.
Now let the sets V, U, ff
i
g and cons be given and let T (V;U; ff
i
g;cons) be the class of ex-
tended propositional causal theories hV;U; P (u); ff
i
g;consi for which P (u) is simple. Hence the
class T (V;U; ff
i
g;cons) consists of causal theories T
EP
which all share the same models but not
the same preferred models. We say that a model M is potentially preferred i there is a theory in
T (V;U; ff
i
g;cons) for which it is a preferred model. In other words, there exists a simple P (u)
such that M is among the most probable models for T = hV;U; P (u); ff
i
g;consi. If we are given
V;U; ff
i
g and cons but the only thing we know about P (u) is that it is simple, it seems reasonable
to consider any model that is potentially preferred. The proposition below shows that the `minimal
models' in the usual sense of nonmonotonic logic coincide exactly with the models that are `potentially
preferred'.
Proposition 1.2 M is potentially a preferred model for the class of theories T

= T (V;U; ff
i
g;cons)
i there is no model M
0
for the theories in T

with
fAb j Ab 2 Ab;M
0
j= Abg  fAb j Ab 2 Ab;M j= Abg (8)
Proof: (only-if) Suppose M is a potentially preferred model for T

. So M is preferred for some
T 2 T

. Let P
T
(u) be the distribution associated with this T . Remember that we identied the
probability of a single model under distribution P (u) with the joint probability of all U 2 U (cf. the
remark previous to denition 1.4 on page 33).
Now let us assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a model M
0
for one of the theories T
0
in T

such that M
0
has property (8). Since M
0
is a model for T
0
, it is also a model for T (since
T
0
and T share the same V;U; ff
i
g and cons). We will show that M
0
has higher probability under
P
T
(u) thanM. This implies thatM is not a preferred model of T and hence we arrive at the desired
contradiction.
We show that indeed PfM
0
g > PfMg. First, we dene M[U
i
] to be the u
i
2 B for which
M j= U
i
 u
i
. We also dene for any Ab 2 Ab: PfAbg := PfAb  trueg. Note that since P (u) is
simple, we have by denition 1.7:
P (M
0
) =
Y
U2U
PfU
i
=M
0
[U
i
]g = PfMg 
Y
Ab2D
1  PfAbg
PfAbg
= PfMg 
Y
Ab2D
1  
Ab

Ab
where D is the non-empty set fAb 2 Ab j M j= Ab and M
0
6j= Abg. Since all 
Ab
< 1=2, this shows
that PfM
0
g > PfMg.
(if) In this case, let T be a theory hV;U; ff
i
g; P (u);consi with P (u) such that for all Ab 2 Ab with
M j= Ab, P (Ab) = 1=2   where  > 0 is some small number, while P (Ab
0
) =  for all Ab
0
2 Ab with
M 6j= Ab
0
. Clearly, P (u) is simple so indeed T 2 T

. We are assuming that there is no model M
0
for
which (8) holds. It is easy to see that this implies that for  small enough, M must be the model for
T that has the highest probability. 2
We see that the probabilistic view on uncertainty taken in Pearl's original denition can be reconciled
with a minimal subset-minimization policy as is adopted in the main text, as long as we interpret
the propositional variables Ab 2 Ab as things that occur with small (< 1=2) but, apart from that,
unknown probabilities. We can further extend the concept of `potentially preferred models' to coincide
with the rst-order `minimal models' as dened in section 7.4. We will not do this in full detail; in
stead, we will only roughly indicate how such an extension may be achieved:
First, we may extend our concept of `potentially preferred models' to several `levels' of abnormal-
ity by further partitioning U. For example, we may set U = Ind [ Ab
1
[ Ab
2
where Ab
1
con-
tains propositions Ab
1
with P (Ab
1
) < 1=2 while Ab
2
contains propositions Ab
2
with 0 < P (Ab
2
) <
38
min
Ab
1
2Ab
1
(P (Ab
1
))
k
where k is the number of abnormality propositions in Ab
1
. In this way, models
without abnormalities in Ab
2
will always be preferred over models with abnormalities in Ab
2
, no
matter the number of abnormalities in Ab
1
.
We also need to take care of the following: our notion of preferred models depends on the assumption
that the set of structural equations (1) has a unique solution for X
i
; : : : ; X
n
, given any instantiation of
the variables in U. This need not be the case for (both propositional and rst-order) causal theories
as dened in the main text. For example, there will be no structural equations that indicate the
value of a uent at time 0: 2-point causal theories do not contain structural equations of the form
F
i
(0)  , since, in the absence of axioms in cons, we want both models with M j= F
i
(0) and
models with M 6j= F
i
(0). But, in light of proposition 1.1 on page 34 we can always transform such an
`incompletely specied' set of structural equations into a complete one by introducing new assumption
symbols! In our example, we can add F
i
(0) = Ind
i
for all F
i
2 F to our set of structural equations.
In this case, the value of Ind
i
determines a unique solution for F
i
(0). If we let P (Ind
i
= true) =
P (Ind
i
= false) = 1=2, then neither of the two values for Ind
i
will be preferred.
Finally, we note that the notion of `preferred models for theories with simple P (u)' can be extended
to the rst-order case considered in the main text, simply by replacing the set of abnormality proposi-
tions by a single abnormality predicate Ab
1
and letting each instantiation of Ab
1
stand for a separate
abnormality.
2. Appendix: The Model-Theoretic Characterization of Circumscription
The following is all taken from [18].
Let T be a rst-order theory for some language L; let P be a tuple of predicate constants for L and
let Z be a tuple of function and/or predicate constants for L disjoint with P . For any two structures
M
1
and M
2
for the language L, we write M
1

P ;Z
M
2
if
(i) jM
1
j = jM
2
j
(ii) M
1
[[K]] =M
2
[[K]] for every constant K not in P;Z
(iii) M
1
[[P
i
]] M
2
[[P
i
]] for every P
i
in P .
If M
1

P ;Z
M
2
but not M
2

P ;Z
M
1
we write M
1
<
P ;Z
M
2
. We call a structure M minimal in
a class M of structures if M2M and there is no structure M
0
2M such that M
0
<
P ;Z
M .
The `circumscription of P in T with Z varied' which we write as Circum(T ;P ;Z) is dened as a
formula in second-order logic (we will not repeat this formula here, see [26, 18]). However, we may
also characterize circumscription as follows:
Proposition 2.1 (Lifschitz 1985) A structure M is a model of Circum(T ;P ;Z) i M is minimal
in the class of models of T with respect to <
P ;Z
.
3. Appendix: McCain & Turner vs. 2-point causal theories
3.1 Formal Denition of MT's Next-State Function
The denitions in this section have all been copied from [25, 24]. MT start with a propositional
language which includes the 0-ary logical connectives true and false. true and :false are tau-
tologies in which no atoms occur. Each interpretation is identied with the set of literals true in it.
A causal law is dened to be an expression of the from  )  where  and  are formulas of the
propositional language. A set of causal laws is called a causal theory. Now for every causal theory D
and interpretation I , we let
D
I
= f : for some , )  2 D and I j= g :
That is, D
I
is the set of consequents of all causal laws in D whose antecedents are true in I .
Denition 3.1 Let D be a causal theory and I be an interpretation. We say that I is causally
explained according to D if I is the unique model of D
I
.
39
We now dene 
1
(S;E;C). It is a function on initial states S, explicit eects E and background
knowledge C. A state is just an interpretation; an explicit eect is a set of formulas; the background
knowledge is a set of causal laws.
Denition 3.2 For any interpretation S, set of propositional formulas E and set of causal laws C,

1
(S;E;C) is dened to be the set consisting of all states that are causally explained according to the
causal theory
fL) L : L 2 Sg [ ftrue)  :  2 Eg [ C
We will repeatedly use the following lemma which gives a precise characterization of 
1
(S;E;C). It
was rst presented by McCain & Turner [25] but without proof. The proof however is not dicult;
we provide one below.
Lemma 3.1 (McCain & Turner) For any interpretation S, set of propositional formulas E and
set of causal laws C, a state S
0
belongs to 
1
(S;E;C) if and only if
 S
0
j= E [ C
S
0
 S
0
n S  f :  is a literal and (S \ S
0
) [E [ C
S
0
j= g
Proof: To prove the lemma, we rst need the following observation (the proof of which is trivial and
omitted):
Claim For any two causal theories A and B and any interpretation I and any propositional formula
 , we have  2 (A [ B)
I
,  2 A
I
[ B
I
.
From repeatedly applying the claim and inspection of denition 3.2 it follows that it is sucient to
prove the following:
Restated Lemma S
0
is the unique model of X = (S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
i
C1. S
0
j= E [ C
S
0
and
C2. S
0
n S  f :  is a literal and (S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
j= g
We rst show the only-if direction, so let us assume that S
0
is the unique model of X . Then C1 holds
trivially. To see that C2 holds, notice that S
0
is the unique model of X , so for all literals  in S
0
,
X j= . Hence S
0
= f :  is a literal and X j= g from which C2 follows.
Now for the if-direction. For this, suppose S
0
is not the unique model of X . Then either S
0
is
not a model of X at all or there is more than one model for X . In the rst case, note that always
S
0
j= S \ S
0
, so if S
0
j= E [ C
S
0
then also S
0
j= (S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
and thus S
0
j= X . From this it
follows that if S
0
6j= X , then also S
0
6j= E [ C
S
0
so C1 does not hold and we are done.
In the second case (i.e. there is more than one model for X), note that there must be a literal 
such that neither  nor : is contained in X . This implies  62 S \S
0
and : 62 S \S
0
, it follows that
either (S j= : and S
0
j= ) or (S j=  and S
0
j= :). In the rst case,  2 S
0
n S while by denition
of ,  62 X . This means that C2 does not hold which is what we had to prove. In the second case,
one can prove that C2 is violated in an analogous way. 2
3.2 Proof of proposition 8.1
Take S, E and C as in the statement of the proposition. Let S
0
be any member of 
1
(S;E;C). By
lemma 3.1 in appendix 3.1 it follows that S
0
j= E and hence X 2 S
0
. This means C
S
0
must contain
Y _ Z. Applying lemma 3.1 again, we nd S
0
j= Y _ Z. So there are three possibilities left for S
0
:
S
0
2 fS
1
; S
2
; S
3
g where S
1
= fX;Y; Zg, S
2
= fX;Y;:Zg, S
1
= fX;:Y; Zg. Now the second part of
lemma 3.1 does not hold for S
0
= S
1
while it does hold for S
0
= S
2
and S
0
= S
3
. The rst part of the
lemma also holds for S
0
= S
2
and S
0
= S
3
, so 
1
(S;E;C) = fS
2
; S
3
g.
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3.3 Proof of theorem 8.1
Our proof makes repeated use of lemma 3.1 of appendix 3.1. We rst prove the rst part of theorem 8.1,
which is restated below. We use the notation introduced in def. 8.1, i.e. we will sometimes write F
true
i
to denote F
i
and F
false
i
to denote :F
i
.
Theorem 3.1 (part I) For any theory T
c
and any domain description T
mt
= (S;E;C) such that
T
c
 T
mt
, we have S
0
2 
1
(S;E;C)) there exists an M with Mj=
c
T
c
and M

=
(S; S
0
)
Proof: For any given S;E;C; S
0
2 
1
(S;E;C) and T
c
we will now rst construct a model M with
M

=
(S; S
0
). We then show Mj=
c
T
c
.
Construction of M We construct a causal model M according to the following denition, in which
we identify sets containing conjunctions of literals with the sets containing just the constituting literals:
1. The initial state of M is S; the nal state of M is S
0
. In other words: F
i
2 S ,M j= F
i
(0);
F
i
2 S
0
,M j= F
i
(1).
2. F
b
i
2 E [ C
S
0
,M j= Do(F
i
(1); b).
It is clear that a model M satisfying all the conditions above can indeed be constructed. It follows
immediately from the denition of `

=
' (def. 8.2) and item 1 in the construction ofM thatM

=
(S; S
0
).
We now prove that Mj=
c
T
c
. We show this in three stages: in stage 1, we show M j= cons. We
use this to show in stage 2 that M is a minimal model for cons of A(V) within context Mc
V[U
.
This shows that M satises condition (1) of denition 4.3. In stage 3, we show that M also satises
condition (2) of that denition.
Stage 1 We have to show that M j=  for all axioms  contained in cons. From def. 8.1, item 2, it
follows that it is sucient to show that M j=  for all sentences in cons that correspond to either S
or to the sentences in E and C. By items 3 and 4 of the same denition and the construction of M
above, it follows immediately that indeed M j=  for the sentences  that correspond to S and E.
Concerning C, let   be any sentence in cons of the form (5). We will show M j=  . Let us write
     	 with 	 of the form Do(F
i
1
(1); b
1
) ^ : : : ^ Do(F
i
m
(1); b
m
). If M 6j=  we are done, so
let us suppose M j= . By construction of M, we have S
0
j= 
0
where 
0
is obtained from  by
replacing all occurrences of F
i
(1) in  by F
i
. By item 5 of def. 8.1, C must contain a rule of form

0
) F
b
1
i
1
^ : : : ^ F
b
m
i
m
and, since S
0
j= 
0
, we conclude that F
b
j
i
j
2 C
S
0
for all 1  j  m. Hence by
item 2 of the construction of M, M j= 	 and hence M j=  .
Stage 2 We have to show that M is a minimal element for cons of A(V) within the set
M (M) = fM
0
j M
0
and M have the same interpretation of V [Ug
For this, let M
0
2 M (M) be a model for cons. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f 2
A(V) j M
0
j= g is a proper subset of f 2 A(V) j M j= g. Then there is a pair (F
i
; b) such that
M
0
6j= Do(F
i
; b) while M j= Do(F
i
; b). M is constructed such that F
b
i
2 E [ C
S
0
. Now if F
b
i
2 E,
then, by def. 8.1, item 4, M
0
6j= cons and we arrive at a contradiction. So suppose F
b
i
2 C
S
0
. It
follows from the denition of C
S
0
that S
0
j= 
0
for a 
0
such that C contains some sentence of form

0
) 	
0
and F
b
i
2 	
0
. Hence by def. 8.1, item 5, cons contains the sentence   	 where ;	 stand
to 
0
;	
0
as required in that item of the denition. Since S
0
j= 
0
, by the construction of M, we have
M j= . SinceM
0
andM share the same interpretations of the variables in V, we also haveM
0
j= .
We assumed M
0
j= cons so also M
0
j= 	 and in particular M
0
j= Do(F
i
; b). But we assumed the
contrary so we have arrived at a contradiction.
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Stage 3 We have to show that M j= eq
0
where eq
0
is the updated set of structural equations
referred to in condition (2) of def. 4.3. By construction of M, there are two cases for each F
i
: either
eq
0
contains F
i
(1)  b for some b or eq
0
contains F
i
(1)  F
i
(0).
The rst case happens if M j= Do(F
i
(1); b). By construction of M, it follows that in this case
F
b
i
2 E [ C
S
0
. By lemma 3.1 and the fact that S
0
2 
1
(S;E;C) we have S
0
j= E [ C
S
0
and thus
S
0
j= F
b
i
. Then by construction of M, indeed M j= F
i
(1)  b and we are done.
The second case happens if M 6j= Do(F
i
; b) for any b 2 B. It follows from the construction of
M that in this case there is no b such that F
b
i
2 E [ C
S
0
. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that M 6j= F
i
(1)  F
i
(0). Then (by construction of M), F
b
i
2 S
0
n S for some b. By lemma 3.1,
(S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
j= F
b
i
. Clearly, F
b
i
62 S \ S
0
. We have already shown that F
b
i
cannot be in
E [ C
S
0
either. Since both S \ S
0
and E [ C
S
0
only contain conjunctions of literals, it follows that
(S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
6j= F
b
i
and we have reached a contradiction. 2
We now restate and prove the second part of theorem 8.1.
Theorem 3.1 (part II) If we have a theory T
c
and a T
mt
= (S;E;C) such that T
c
 T
mt
,
then
Mj=
c
T
c
) 
1
(S;E;C) contains an S
0
with M

=
(S; S
0
)
Proof: We will dene S
0
in terms of a given model M with Mj=
c
T
c
, as follows: for all F
i
:
F
i
2 S
0
,M j= F
i
(1). We will show that this S
0
is contained in 
1
(S;E;C) and that M

=
(S; S
0
).
Since Mj=
c
T
c
and thus M j= cons we know by items 2 and 3 of def. 8.1 that for all F
i
:
F
i
2 S ,M j= F
i
(0). From this and the denition of S
0
above it follows M

=
(S; S
0
). It remains to
be shown that S
0
2 
1
(S;E;C). By lemma 3.1 it is sucient to prove claims 1 and 2 below.
Claim 1 S
0
j= E [ C
S
0
.
To prove this, we show that for all F
b
i
with F
b
i
2 E and for all F
b
i
with F
b
i
2 C
S
0
we have S
0
j= F
b
i
.
In the rst case (F
b
i
2 E), as M j= cons and by def. 8.1, item 4, we have M j= Do(F
i
(1); b). Since
M j= eq
0
this means M j= F
b
i
(1). From the denition of S
0
, we now have S
0
j= F
b
i
and we are done.
In the second case, i.e. F
b
i
2 C
S
0
, C must contain a law of form 
0
) 	
0
such that S
0
j= 
0
and one
of the conjuncts in 	
0
is F
b
i
. By def. of S
0
and denition 8.1, item 5, we also have M j=  where
  	 is the sentence in cons that corresponds to 
0
 	
0
. As M j= cons, we have M j= 	 and in
particular M j= Do(F
i
(1); b). As M j= eq
0
, it follows M j= F
b
i
(1) and hence, by def. of S
0
, S
0
j= F
b
i
.
Claim 2 S
0
n S  f : (S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
j= g.
To prove this, we show that for any F
b
i
, if F
b
i
2 S
0
nS, then we must also have F
b
i
2 (S\S
0
)[E [C
S
0
.
So suppose F
b
i
2 S
0
n S. By def. of S
0
, we have for such an F
b
i
that M j= F
b
i
(1) ^ :F
b
i
(0). Since
M j= eq
0
, the structural equation F
i
(1)  F
i
(0) cannot be in eq
0
and thus there must have been an
intervention: we must haveM j= Do(F
i
(1); b). Now as Mj=
c
T
c
, there can be no other M
0
j= cons
with the same interpretations of V and U but with a smaller (in the subset sense) interpretation of
the `Do' variables. This means that cons must contain an axiom somehow mentioning Do(F
i
(1); b).
From def. 8.1 we see there are two possibilities: The rst possibility is that cons contains the axiom
Do(F
i
(1); b), i.e. an axiom of the form given in item 4 of def. 8.1. In this case, it follows F
b
i
2 E so
F
b
i
2 (S \ S
0
) [E [ C
S
0
and we are done.
The second possibility is that cons contains an axiom of form (5) whileM j=  where  is as in (5)
and one of the conjuncts on the right-hand side of the axiom is Do(F
i
(1); b). In that case, C contains
the corresponding rule 
0
) 	
0
with F
b
i
2 	
0
and, by def. of S
0
, 
0
2 S
0
. Therefore, F
b
i
2 C
S
0
and
hence F
b
i
2 (S \ S
0
) [ E [ C
S
0
and we are done. 2
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4. Appendix: L
3
and first-order causal theories
4.1 Formal denition of modelhood
The denitions in this section have all been copied from [3]. In order to formally dene the notion
of `model', we rst need to introduce a menagerie of other concepts. For detailed explanation of
these concepts and clarifying examples, we refer to [3]. Roughly, the denition of `model' for BG's
domain descriptions D (def. 4.4) makes use of two other, more basic concepts: the rst is the notion
of causal model, which will be introduced below. The second is the notion of a fact being true in an
interpretation M , a notion which will be introduced directly after.
In all that follows,  stands for concatenation: For a given sequence of objects  and an object a,
the `concatenation of  and a', written as   a, stands for the sequence of  followed by a.
Causal Models A state is a set of uent names. A causal interpretation is a partial function 	 from
sequences of actions to states such that 1) the empty sequence [] belongs to the domain of 	 and 2)
	 is prex-closed, i.e. for any sequence of actions  and any action a, if   a is in the domain of 	
then so is .
Given a uent f and a state , we say that f is true in  if f 2 ; :f is true in  if f 62 . The
truth of a propositional formula C with respect to  is dened as usual.
A uent f is an immediate eect of (executing) a in  if there is an eect law
`a causes f if p
1
; : : : ; p
n
' in D whose preconditions p
1
; : : : p
n
hold in .
A uent f is an inherited eect of (executing) a in  if there is b  a such that 1) f is an immediate
eect of b in ; b) there is no action c such that b  c  a and :f is an immediate eect of c in .
f is an eect of (executing) a in  if either f is an immediate eect of a in  or f is an inherited
eect of a in .
Now let E
+
a
() = ff : f is an eect of a in g,E
 
a
() = ff : :f is an eect of a in g andRes(a; ) =
 [ E
+
a
() nE
 
a
().
Denition 4.1 A causal interpretation 	 satises eect laws of D if for any sequence   a from the
language of D:
	(  a) = Res(a;	(a)) if E
+
a
(	()) \ E
 
a
(	()) = ;
and undened otherwise.
We say that 	 is a causal model of D if it satises all the eect laws of D.
Truth of Facts We already dened a situation assignment on page 26. We will now make our
denition of `interpretation' (also page 26) more precise:
For any domain description D and any causal interpretation 	 that is a causal model of D, an
interpretation M of L
3
is a pair (	;) where 	 is a causal model of D,  is a situation assignment
of S and (s
N
) belongs to the domain of 	.
Denition 4.2 For any interpretation M = (	;),
1. (f at s) is true in M (or satised by M) if f is true in 	((s)).
2. Atomic fact ([a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] occurs at s) is true in M if there is a sequence  = [b
1
; : : : ; b
n
] of
actions such that 1) The sequence (s)   is a prex of the actual path of M , and 2) for any
i; 1  i  n, a

i
 b
i
. Here a

i
is an instance
7
of a
i
.
3. (s
1
precedes s
2
) is true in M if (s
1
) is a proper prex of (s
2
).
4. Truth of non-atomic facts in M is dened as usual.
A set of facts is true in interpretation M if all its members are true in M .
7
For any compound action a

and any generalized action a, we say a

is an instance of a if a = a
1
j : : : ja
m
and for
some 1  i  m, a
i
= a

.
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Models of domain descriptions D First, we need to introduce one more concept:
Denition 4.3 Let  = [a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] and  = [b
1
; : : : ; b
m
] be sequences of actions. We say that   
if there exists a subsequence
8
[b
i
1
; : : : ; b
i
n
] of  such that for every a
k
2 ; a
k
 b
i
k
.
We can now nally dene what it means to be a model:
Denition 4.4 [3] An interpretation M = (	;) is called a model of a domain description D in
L
3
if the following conditions are satised:
C1. 	 is a causal model of D
C2. facts of D are true in M
C3. there is no other interpretation N = (	
0
;
0
) such that N satises the conditions C1. and C2.
and 
0
(s
N
)  (s
N
) and 
0
(s
N
) 6= (s
N
) and 	
0
(
0
(s
N
)) is dened.
The denition given above is slightly dierent from the one given in [3, 5]. This is because we opt
for the version of BG's approach in which the models with the least number of actions are always
preferred (see page 28). At page 10 of [5], it is claimed that in this case, the denition should be with
C1 and C2 as above, but C3 replaced by
C3'. there is no other interpretation N = (	
0
;
0
) such that N satises the conditions C1. and C2.
and 
0
(s
N
)  (s
N
).
However, we must assume that BG have made a mistake here: it is easy to show that if one used C3'
in stead of C3, then there will be no models for any domain description D whatsoever. We therefore
opt for the unproblematic version of C3 given above.
4.2 Proof of proposition 8.3
We abbreviate all uent and action names in the obvious way.
We have F = fWg;A = fLL;LR; Tg;S = fs
0
; s
N
g. SupposeM = (	;) is a model of D. We then
have by denition 4.4, C2 and (15) that :W at s
0
must hold inM . By def. 4.2, item 2 it follows that
	([]) = ; (i.e. :W is true in 	([])). Also, 	 must be a causal model of D. It is straightforward to
verify that for a = fT; LL;LRg we have E
+
a
(	()) \ E
 
a
(	()) = fWg. Denition. 4.1 now tells us
that 	([fT; LL;LRg]) is undened. Now since by def. 4.2, item 2, we have for any model M = (	;)
of D that [fT; LL;LRg] is a prex of (s
N
), it follows that 	((s
N
)) is undened too, i.e. M does
not determine what happens after s
0
. 2
4.3 Proof of theorem 8.2
The proof of theorem 8.2 is necessarily quite involved, the reason being that both our denition
of `preferred models' and BG's denition of models contain a self-reference: a model Mj=
c
T
c
is
preferred if there is no other model M
0
j=
c
T
c
with a smaller interpretation of Ab
1
. Similarly, M is
a model of D if there is no other model satisfying conditions C1 and C2 of def. 4.4 in which fewer
actions happen. For this reason, we will rst show that for corresponding M and M, we have that
the same uents and events hold at the same time (lemma 4.1). We use this result to show that for
correspondingM andM
0
, we haveMj=
c
T
c
i conditions C1 and C2 hold for M (this is essentially
what happens in lemmas 4.2,4.3 and 4.4). Only then will we be in a position to prove the theorem
itself. We start by proving the four lemmas mentioned.
8
Given a sequence X = x
1
; : : : ; x
m
, another sequence Z = z
1
; : : : ; z
n
is a subsequence of X if there exists a strictly
increasing sequence i
1
; : : : ; i
n
of indices of X such that for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; n, we have x
i
j
= z
j
.
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Correspondence of Facts In the following, whenever we mention T
c
, we mean a causal theory T
c
dened for a language L(D;E;F;T) according to denition 8.4.
Lemma 4.1 For any T
c
for an instance of our language and any non-ambiguous domain description
D for a language L
3
= (F ;A;S) such that T
c
 D, letM = (	;) be any interpretation of (F ;A;S)
and M be any interpretation of our language such that M

=
M. Let F be any fact in D and  be
any axiom in cons such that F and  are corresponding facts (where correspondence is dened as in
def. 8.5, items 5-8). We have:
F is true in M ,M j=  (1)
Proof of lemma 4.1: The fact F mentioned in the lemma can either be atomic or non-atomic. We
rst consider atomic facts. They can be of three kinds: uent facts, occurrence facts and precedence
facts. We only give the proof for uent facts. The proofs for the other two cases follow the same
scheme as the one for uent facts so we omit them.
So suppose that F is a uent fact `f at s'. We show that if F is true in M , then the corresponding
uent fact  holds in M. Notice  equals `Ho(f; s)'.
So suppose F is true in M . It follows that f is true in 	((s)), so f 2 
t
for the t that is equal to
the length of the sequence (s). Now since M

=
M, it follows from def. 8.6 that M j= Ho(f; t) and
M j= s = t, so M j= Ho(f; s), so M j= .
If  holds in M, then it follows that F is true in D by an analogous line of reasoning, but in the
other direction. We omit the details.
We now consider non-atomic facts. The truth of non-atomic facts F in an interpretationM is dened
in terms of its constituent atomic facts in exactly the same manner as the truth of non-atomic sentences
for a model M is dened in terms of its constituent atoms. Since we have already proven that the
lemma holds for all atomic facts, it follows that it still holds for non-atomic facts. 2
Causal Consistency and its Lemma's
Denition 4.5 (Causally Consistent) For any T
c
for an instance of our language and any non-
ambiguous domain description D for a language L
3
= (F ;A;S) such that T
c
 D, let M = (	;)
be any interpretation of (F ;A;S) and M be any interpretation of our language. We say that M and
M are causally consistent i
1. M

=
M.
2. M j= 8e; b; t: :Do(e; b; t)
3. For all F
b
i
: a)M j= :Do(F
i
; b; 0). b) for all t 2 f1; 2; : : :g: M j= Do(F
i
; b; t) i cons contains
an axiom  of form (18) such that 1) the F
i
and b mentioned in the right-hand side of  are
equal to the F
i
and b mentioned here and 2) the left-hand side of  holds in M.
4. M j= 8e; t : Ab
1
(e; t)  Ho(e; t).
5. jMj
b
= B; jMj
e
= E; jMj
f
= F; M interprets all constants in B, E and F as themselves.
6. 	 is a causal model of D.
Lemma 4.2 For any T
c
for an instance of our language and any non-ambiguous domain description
D for a language L
3
= (F ;A;S) such that T
c
 D, letM = (	;) be any interpretation of (F ;A;S)
and M be any interpretation of our language such that M

=
M. We have:
Mj=
c
T
c
) All facts of D are true in M (2)
and furthermore
All facts of D are true in M & M and M are causally consistent (3)
)
Mj=
c
T
c
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Lemma 4.3 For any T
c
for an instance of our language and any domain description D for a lan-
guage L
3
= (F ;A;S) such that T
c
 D, let M = (	;) be any interpretation of D such that 1)
M satises conditions C1 and C2 of denition 4.4 and 2) 	((s
N
)) is dened. Then there exists an
interpretation M of our language such that M and M are causally consistent.
Lemma 4.4 For any T
c
for an instance of our language and any non-ambiguous domain descrip-
tion D for a language L
3
= (F ;A;S) such that T
c
 D, let Mj=
c
T
c
. Then there exists an
interpretation M = (	;) of L
3
such that M and M are causally consistent.
Proofs of lemma's 4.2-4.4
Proof of lemma 4.2 (rst part) We prove the contrapositive of (2). Suppose not all facts of D hold
in M . By lemma 4.1, the fact that M

=
M and the denition of corresponding theories (def. 8.5) it
follows that M 6j= cons and therefore M6j=
c
T
c
. 2
Proof of lemma 4.2 (second part) Suppose we have an M andM such that M

=
M and (3) holds.
We show in three stages thatMj=
c
T
c
: in stage 1, we showM j= cons. We use this to show in stage
2 that M j= Circum(cons;Do). In stage 3, we show that M j= eq. Stage 1{3 together show that
M satises condition (1) of the denition of models for causal theories (def. 7.2). That M satises
condition (2) of that denition follows already from the denition of `

=
' (def. 8.6, item (b)).
Stage 1 We show that M j=  for all axioms  contained in cons. From def. 8.5, item 2, it follows
that cons contains UNA- and DC-axioms for B, E and F. It follows directly from the fact that
M and M are causally consistent that these axioms hold for M too. We now consider the axioms
of form (18) in cons (def. 8.5 item 4). Let us denote by  any of these axioms.  can be written
as 8t:H(t)  Do(F
b
i
; t + 1) where H is some conjunction of instances of Ho. We now show that
for all t  0, M j= H(t)  Do(F
i
; b; t + 1). Since we assume that time points are interpreted as
the nonnegative integers, this is sucient to show M j= . So take any t  0. For this t, either
M 6j= H(t) and we are done. If M j= H(t) then by the denition of causal consistency, we have
M j= Do(F
i
; b; t+ 1) and we are done again.
It follows from lemma 4.1 and the fact that all facts of D are true in M that M j=  for all axioms
 in T
c
mentioned in items 5{8 of denition 8.5 (all these axioms correspond to some fact in D).
From item 3 of def. 8.5, we conclude that cons contains no more axioms than those for which we
already checked that they hold in M. This completes stage 1.
Stage 2 We show that M j= Circum(cons;Do). Notice rst that by proposition 7.1 all models
share the same universes for cons. From this and the characterization of circumscription given in
proposition 2.1 it follows that it is sucient to show that among all the models for cons with the
same interpretation of Ho, there is no M
0
whose interpretation of Do is a proper subset of that of
M. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that such anM
0
exists, i.e. M
0
j= cons, M[[Ho]] =M
0
[[Ho]]
but M
0
[[Do]]  M[[Do]]. By the denition of causal consistency, item 2, M and therefore also M
0
have :Do(e; b; t) for any e; b; t. It follows there is a pair (F
b

i

; t

) with M
0
j= :Do(F
i

; b

; t

+ 1)
while M j= Do(F
i

; b

; t

+ 1). It follows from the denition of causal consistency, item 3 that T
c
contains an axiom  of form (18) where 1) the F
i
,b and t mentioned in the right-hand side of  are
equal to F
i

,b

and t

and 2) the left-hand side of  holds in M, and therefore also in M
0
. But also
M
0
j= cons so M
0
j= Do(F
i

; b

; t

) and we arrive at a contradiction.
Stage 3 We show that M j= eq by showing that axioms (1) and (2), (4) and (15) hold in M. By
items 2 and 4 of the denition of causal consistency and the fact thatM andM are causally consistent
it follows that (15) holds in M. Concerning (1) and (2), we must show that for all x 2 E [F; t 2 N
0
,
ifM j= Do(x;true; t) then we also haveM j= Ho(x; t) and similarly, ifM j= Do(x; false; t) then we
also haveM j= :Ho(x; t). Let us thus assume M j= Do(x; b; t) for some x 2 E[F, t 2 N
0
and b 2 B.
SinceM j= :Do(e; b; t) for any e; b and t (see the denition of causal consistency), we may assume x =
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F
b
i
for some F
i
2 F. From the same denition, it follows t  1 and that cons must contain an axiom 
of form (18) such that the right-hand side of  is equal to Do(F
i
; b; t) and the left-hand side holds inM.
It follows D contains an eect law of form (19), i.e. of form fa
1
; : : : ; a
n
g causes F
b
i
if F
b
1
j
1
; : : : ; F
b
m
j
m
.
Since M = (	;) corresponds to M we have that fa
1
; : : : ; a
n
g  a
t 1
and F
b
1
j
1
; : : : ; F
b
m
j
m
all hold in

t 1
. By the following claim we have that F
b
i
is an eect of a
t 1
in 
t 1
.
Sublemma 4.1 Let  be a state for a non-ambiguous domain description D. Let f be a uent literal
and a be a compound action. Now suppose there is b  a such that f is an immediate eect of b in
. Then f is an (ordinary) eect of a in .
Proof: follows almost directly from the denitions of immediate eect, inherited eect (section 4.1
and ambiguity (def. 8.3) . We omit the details. 2
By the denition of causal consistency 	 is a causal model of D and M

=
M. Since M

=
M,
	((s
N
)) is dened. We now have by the claim below that 
t
is dened.
Claim LetM = (	;) be an interpretation for some domain description D. If 	((s
N
)) is dened,
then for all t  0, 
t
is dened.
Proof: is immediate from the denition of 
t
in def. 8.6. 2
Since 
t
is dened, it follows by def. 4.1 that 
t
= Res(a
t 1
; 
t 1
). Since F
b
i
is an eect of a
t 1
in

t 1
, this means F
b
i
is contained in 
t
. Since M

=
M, we have M j= Ho(F
b
i
; t), which is what we
had to prove.
We will now show that M j= (4). For this, supposeM j= :Ho(F
b
i
; t  1)^Ho(F
b
i
; t) for some F
b
i
and
t. One can show M j= Do(F
i
; b; t) in a manner analogous to (but simpler than) the reasoning in the
rst part of stage 3, above. We omit the details of this part of the proof. Since we can show this for
any t > 0, any b and any F
i
, it follows by proposition 7.1 that the following axiom holds for M:
8f; t :(t > 0) 
:[ Ho(f; t)  Ho(f; t  1) ]  [ Do(f;true; t) _ Do(f; false; t) ]
which is clearly equivalent to (4). This ends the proof of lemma 4.2. 2
Proof of lemma 4.3 	((s
N
)) is dened; this means denition 8.6 applies. Items (1) and (2) of
the denition determine the interpretation of Ho(x; t) for all x 2 E [ F and all t  0 in a way that
clearly cannot lead to any contradiction. Also, it is clear that item (3) in the denition cannot lead
to any contradictory assignment in M of time name symbols to time points. Hence an interpretation
M

=
M exists. Now items 2 to 5 of the denition of causal consistency determine the interpretations
of all atoms in M other than those of the form Ho(x; t), again in a way that cannot give rise to any
contradiction. 2
Proof of lemma 4.4 It follows immediately from the fact that Mj=
c
T
c
and the form that cons
must have according to def. 8.5, that conditions 2 and 3 of the denition of causal consistency hold for
M. Since condition 2 holds and Mj=
c
T
c
and so, in particular, M j= Circum(cons;Do), condition
4 holds too. By proposition 7.1 condition 5 holds too. Hence it only remains to prove that an
interpretation M = (	;) exists with M

=
M such that 	 is a causal model for D. Using def. 8.6
we can construct such an M as follows:
1. We set (s
N
) = [a
0
; : : : ; a
last
] where a
i
is dened as in def. 8.6, item 1. We dene, for any
s 2 S, (s) to be the prex of (s
N
) of length t for the t for which M j= s = t. This completes
the denition of .
2. We now dene 	: we set for all t  0, 	([a
0
; : : : ; a
t 1
]) = 
t
(we use the convention that
[a
 1
] = [], so 	([]) = 
0
), where the a
i
's are dened as above and 
t
is dened as in def. 8.6,
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item 2. Let us denote by the -sequences those sequences that start with a prex of (s
N
) (note
this includes the empty sequence). Now for any sequence of compound actions that is not a
-sequence we dene 	() to be such that it satises def. 4.1. Note that this is always possible,
since according to that denition 	() is allowed to be undened. It can be seen from that
denition that, since 	([]) has already been dened above, this uniquely denes the function 	
for any sequence that does not start with a prex of (s
N
). This completes the denition of 	.
For any sequence of compound actions except possibly the -sequences, we know (from the way we
dened 	) that 	 satises all the eect laws of D. If we can prove that the -sequences, too, satisfy
all the eect laws of D, we have by def. 4.1 that 	 is a causal model of D and we are done.
We now show that indeed for any -sequence , 	() satises all eect laws of D. We start with
the following claim:
Claim For any -sequence   a
t
= [a
0
; : : : a
t 1
; a
t
], we have E
+
a
t
(	()) \ E
 
a
t
(	()) 6= ;. Proof:
Suppose the above is not the case. Then by def. 4.1, E
+
a
t
(
t
) \ E
 
a
t
(
t
) = ; (here 
t
is dened as
in def. 8.6, item 2. So there is an F
i
2 F such that both F
i
and :F
i
are eects of a
t
in 
t
. Hence
D contains two eect laws of form (19) with right-hand sides F
true
i
and F
false
i
respectively, such
that the preconditions of both laws hold in 
t
and the actions mentioned in both laws are subsets of
a
t
. We call these laws A and A
0
. Since T
C
 D, cons contains two axioms,  and 
0
, of the form
(18) that correspond to A and A
0
, respectively. Now M j= cons, but further, since we dened M
such that def. 8.6, items 1 and 2 hold for M and M , we have that M j= Ho(x; t) where for x we can
substitute any precondition F
b
k
j
k
or unit action a
l
mentioned in either A or A
0
. This means that the
left-hand sides of  and 
0
hold in M. It follows M j= Do(F
i
;true; t) ^ Do(F
i
; false; t). But then
M 6j= eq and thus M6j=
c
T
c
, which is in contradiction to our assumptions. 2
From the claim, it follows that we must prove that for any -sequence   a
t
= [a
0
; : : : a
t 1
; a
t
], for
any t  0, we have 	(  a
t
) = Res(a
t
;	()). From the denition of 
t
and denition 4.1, we know
that this is equivalent to showing that for all F
i
2 F , for all t  0,
F
i
2 
t+1
, F
i
2 [
t
[E
+
a
t
(
t
)] nE
 
a
t
(
t
)] (4)
We will prove (4) using the following
Claim Let either b = true and b = false or vice versa. For any M with Mj=
c
T
c
and any t and
F
i
we have
M j= Ho(F
b
i
; t+ 1),M j= [Ho(F
b
i
; t) _Do(F
i
; b; t+ 1)] ^ :Do(F
i
; b; t+ 1)
Proof: trivial & omitted. 2
We show the if-direction of (4). Suppose F
i
2 
t+1
. Then M j= Ho(F
i
; t+1) and by the claim above,
M j= :Do(F
i
; false; t + 1). This means cons contains no axiom of form (18) with right-hand side
Do(F
i
; false; t+ 1) and left-hand side such that it holds at time t. As T
c
 D and M

=
M, there
is no rule in D of form (19) such that fa
1
; : : : ; a
n
g  a
t
and F
b
1
j
1
; : : : ; F
b
m
j
m
all hold in 
t
. This means
:F
i
is not an eect of a
t
in 
t
so F
i
62 E
 
a
t
(
t
).
From our assumption F
i
2 
t+1
it also follows that either M j= Ho(F
i
; t) orM j= Do(F
i
;true; t+
1). In the rst case, F
i
2 
t
and we are done; in the second case, since Mj=
c
T
c
and thus
M j= Circum(cons;Do), using propositions 2.1 and 7.1, there are no models M
0
for cons with
M
0
[[Ho]] = M[[Ho]] and M
0
6j= Do(F
i
;true; t + 1). This means that for some t, cons must mention
Do(F
i
;true; t+1) in one of its axioms. This can only be an axiom  of form (18) and it follows that
the left-hand side of this axiom, instantiated to time t, holds in M and hence that D contains an
eect law of form (19) corresponding to  such that fa
1
; : : : ; a
m
g  a
t
and F
b
1
j
1
; : : : ; F
b
m
j
m
all hold in

t
. From sublemma 4.1 on page 46 it follows that F
i
is an eect of a
t
in 
t
, so F
i
2 E
+
a
t
(
t
). 2
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The only-if direction of (4) can be proven in a manner completely analogously to the if-direction,
again using the claim above. We omit the details.
This nishes the proof of lemma 4.4. 2
The Actual Proof Before actually giving the proof, we have to introduce yet one more proposition
which says that the set of event-time pairs holding in a model always corresponds to the set of
abnormalities in the model.
Proposition 4.1 For any T
c
for an instance of our language and any domain description D for a
language L
3
such that T
c
 D, let M be any model with Mj=
c
T
c
. For such an M we have:
M[[Ab
1
]] = f(e; t) j M j= Ho(e; t); e 2 E; t 2 N
0
g
Proof: Since T
c
 D, it follows from def. 8.5 that cons contains no axioms mentioning Do(e; b; t) for
any e; b; t. Hence the circumscription of Do in cons will ensure that in all models M with Mj=
c
T
c
we have M j= 8e; b; t : :Do(e; b; t): The proposition then follows immediately from axiom (15) and
the fact that all models of T
c
interpret all elements of E and F as themselves (proposition 7.1). 2
We now rst prove the rst part of theorem 8.2, which is restated below.
Theorem 4.2 (part I) For any theory T
c
for our language and any domain description D for a
language L
3
of Baral and Gelfond's such that a) T
c
 D and b) D is not ambiguous, we have:
M = (	;) is a model for D such that 	((s
N
)) is dened)
there exists an M with M

=
M such that M is a preferred model of T
c
Proof: By lemma 4.2 and lemma 4.3 together we have that there exists an M with Mj=
c
T
c
that
is causally consistent to M . Clearly M

=
M . Suppose that M is not preferred, i.e. that there is
an M

j=
c
T
c
with M

[[Ab
1
]] M[[Ab
1
]]. By lemma 4.4, this means that there is an M

= (	

;

)
such that M

and M

are causally consistent and hence condition C1 of the denition of modelhood
(def. 4.4) is satised for M

. Applying lemma 4.2 (rst part) we nd that for such an M

, condition
C2 of that denition is satised too. Since M

[[Ab
1
]] 6=M[[Ab
1
]], we have by proposition 4.1 and the
fact that M

=
M and M


=
M

that 

(s
N
) 6= (s
N
). We are assuming M is a model of D, so we
have by condition C3 in def. 4.4 that it is not the case that 

(s
N
)  (s
N
). Then it is not the case
either that a

t
 a
t
for all t (where a
t
is dened as in def. 8.6, and a

t
stands for the a
t
belonging to


). Since M

=
M and M


=
M

, it follows by denition 8.6 and proposition 4.1 that it is not the
case that M

[[Ab
1
]] M[[Ab
1
]] and we have arrived at a contradiction. 2
We now restate and prove the second part of theorem 8.2.
Theorem 4.2 (part II) For any theory T
c
for our language and any domain description D for a
language L
3
of Baral and Gelfond's such that a) T
c
 D and b) D is not ambiguous, we have, for
all M:
M is a preferred model of T
c
) there exists a model M for D such that M

=
M
Proof: Clearly, if M is a preferred model of T
c
then also Mj=
c
T
c
. By lemma 4.4 we have that
there exists an M that is causally consistent to M and that therefore satises condition C1 of the
denition of modelhood (def. 4.4). Clearly, M

=
M. By lemma 4.2 (rst part) we further have that
M also satises condition C2 of denition 4.4. We now prove that M is a model of D by showing
that assuming that condition C3 of def. 4.4 does not hold for M leads to a contradiction.
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So assume this condition does not hold forM . Then there existsM
0
= (	
0
;
0
) that satisesC1 and
C2 of def. 4.4 with 
0
(s
N
) 6= (s
N
) and 
0
(s
N
)  (s
N
) and 	
0
(
0
(s
N
)) is dened. By lemma 4.3
and lemma 4.2 (second part) together we have that there is anM
0
j=
c
T
c
withM
0

=
M
0
. We will now
`stretch'M
0
into anotherM
00
j=
c
T
c
which will have the property that M
00
[[Ab
1
]] M[[Ab
1
]]. InM
00
exactly the same events and changes take place as inM
0
, but the time in between two events/changes
may be larger. We now prepare the construction of M
00
:
Let (s
N
) = [a
0
; : : : ; a
last
] and 
0
(s
N
) = [a
0
0
; : : : ; a
0
last
]. Notice rst that, since 
0
(s
N
) 6= (s
N
)
and 
0
(s
N
)  (s
N
), there is a strictly increasing sequence of time points x
0
; : : : ; x
last
0
such that for
all 0  t  last
0
we have fe : M
0
j= Ho(e; t)g  fe : M j= Ho(e; x
t
)g where for at least one t, the
inclusion is proper. Also, for all t > last
0
, fe :M
0
j= Ho(e; t)g is empty.
Now deneM
00
as follows: for all 0  t  last
0
, the extension inM
00
of Ho, Ab
1
and Do at time x
t
is
dened to be equal to its extension in M
0
at time t; i.e. for all x: M
0
j= Ho(x; t),M
00
j= Ho(x; x
t
)
and analogously for Do and Ab
1
. We now have to `ll up the gaps' inM
00
, i.e. dene the interpretations
of Ho and Do for the time points in M
00
that are not equal to any of the x
0
; : : : ; x
last
0
. For this, we
set x
 1
:=  1. For all 0  t  last
0
, for all x
t 1
< t
0
< x
t
and t
0
> x
last
0
, dene:
 for all e 2 E: M
00
j= :Ho(e; t
0
) ^ :Ab
1
(e; t
0
).
 for all x 2 E [ F: M
00
j= :Do(x;true; t
0
) ^ :Do(x; false; t
0
).
 for all f 2 F: M
00
j= Ho(f; t
0
),

M
0
j= Ho(f; t) if t
0
< x
t
M
0
j= Ho(f; last
0
+ 1) if t
0
> x
last
0
Clearly, all predicates in the language for M
00
have now been dened for all t; f; e; b (notice that Ab
1
only exists for event-time pairs, not for uent-time pairs, see section 7.4).
One easily veries that anM
00
as dened above indeed exists, and that from the fact thatM
0
j=
c
T
c
,
it follows that also M
00
j=
c
T
c
(simply check all the axioms in cons and eq; we omit the details).
We see that f(e; t)jM
00
j= Ho(e; t)g  f(e; t)jM j= Ho(e; t)g and hence by proposition 4.1M
00
[[Ab
1
]] 
M[[Ab
1
]]. Since 
0
(s
N
) 6= (s
N
), by construction ofM
00
and proposition 4.1 we also haveM
00
[[Ab
1
]] 6=
M[[Ab
1
]]. This means M
00
is preferred over M and hence M is not a preferred model of T
c
, which
is in contradiction with our assumption. 2
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